Firm boundaries, incentives, and fund performance: Evidence from a private pension fund system

Abstract

The private pension fund system in Turkey presents a unique institutional structure where bank holding companies can own both private pension companies and asset management firms. More often than not, pension companies delegate their operational mandates to the asset management arm of the same bank. This practice exposes the retail investor to a double agency problem and raises questions about conflicts of interest and fiduciary duty. Our analysis reveals that the funds set up and managed under the same bank holding company perform worse on a risk-adjusted basis than the funds with an arm's length relationship between the pension company and the asset manager. We show that this relative underperformance is not simply a bank effect; bank-affiliated pension companies and asset managers do just as well, if not better than their peers, when they are not operating under the same roof. Unfortunately, this inefficient institutional structure is not eliminated by market discipline because these funds attract more flows from retail investors, and the underperformance is not discernible in raw returns.