Economics

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10679/316

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    ArticlePublicationOpen Access
    Games with switching costs and endogenous references
    (Wiley, 2022-05-25) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one-player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε-equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.
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    ArticlePublicationOpen Access
    On approximate Nash equilibria of the two-source connection game
    (TÜBİTAK, 2022) Çaşkurlu, B.; Açikalin, U. U.; Kizilkaya, F. E.; Ekici, Özgün; Economics; EKİCİ, Özgün
    The arbitrary-sharing connection game is prominent in the network formation game literature [1]. An undirected graph with positive edge weights is given, where the weight of an edge is the cost of building it. An edge is built if agents contribute a sufficient amount for its construction. For agent i, the goal is to contribute the least possible amount while assuring that the source node si is connected to the terminal node ti. In this paper, we study the special case of this game in which there are only two source nodes. In this setting, we prove that there exists a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium that is socially optimal. We also consider the further special case in which there are no auxiliary nodes (i.e., every node is a terminal or source node). In this further special case, we show that there exists a 3/2 -approximate Nash equilibrium that is socially optimal. Moreover, we show that it is computable in polynomial time.
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    ArticlePublicationOpen Access
    Understanding household healthcare expenditure can promote health policy reform
    (Cambridge University Press, 2023) Best, R.; Tuncay Alpanda, Berna; Economics; ALPANDA, Berna Tuncay
    Studies of health care expenditure often exclude explanatory variables measuring wealth, despite the intuitive importance and policy relevance. We use the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey to assess impacts of income and wealth on health expenditure. We investigate four different dependent variables related to health expenditure and use three main methodological approaches. These approaches include a first difference model and introduction of a lagged dependent variable into a cross-sectional context. The key findings include that wealth tends to be more important than income in identifying variation in health expenditure. This applies for health variables which are not directly linked to means testing, such as spending on health practitioners and for being unable to afford required medical treatment. In contrast, the paper includes no evidence of different impacts of income and wealth on spending on medicines, prescriptions or pharmaceuticals. The results motivate two novel policy innovations. One is the introduction of an asset test for determining rebate eligibility for private health insurance. The second is greater focus on asset testing, rather than income tests, for a wide range of general welfare payments that can be used for health expenditure. Australia's world-leading use of means testing can provide a test case for many countries.