Browsing by Author "Richter, M."

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4

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Aspiration-based choice
(Elsevier, 2018-07) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Tsur, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
Numerous studies and experiments suggest that aspirations for desired but perhaps unavailable alternatives influence decisions. A common finding is that an unavailable aspiration steers agents to choose similar available alternatives. We propose and axiomatically characterize a choice theory consistent with this aspirational effect. Similarity is modeled using a subjective metric derived from choice data. This model offers implications for consumer welfare and its distribution between rich and poor when firms compete for aspirational agents, and a novel rationale for sales.
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Costly switching from a status quo
(Elsevier, 2018-12) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
We axiomatically characterize a theory of status quo-dependent choice where an agent faces switching costs that depend upon both the status quo and the alternative he switches to. In a choice problem with a status quo, the agent chooses the alternatives that yield the highest utility net of switching cost. This generates status quo bias and also allows for a wide range of reference effects. We examine the behavior of such agents in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games. In a single PD game, switching costs can lead to cooperation. However, across different PD games, it is not “anything goes” and instead we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation rates to be consistent with our model. We then verify that these conditions are satisfied by Charness et al.’s (2016) experimental data. We also perform a similar analysis for other theories such as models of status quo bias, magical thinking, inequity aversion, and fairness; and find that these theories make either invalidated or looser predictions.
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An experiment on aspiration-based choice
(Elsevier, 2015-11) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
This paper experimentally studies the influence of aspirations on choice. Motivated by the theoretical model of Guney et al. (2015), we consider choice problems which may include unavailable alternatives. In a choice problem, an aspiration is the most desired alternative there (available or not). In our design, we endogenously derive both aspirations and a subjective similarity notion that operates between an aspiration and other alternatives. We find that (i) choice reversals are more likely when an unavailable aspiration alternative is added into the environment than when an unavailable non-aspiration alternative is added, (ii) an available option is more likely to be chosen when there is an unavailable aspiration that is similar to it compared to when there is no such option in the environment, (iii) choices are better explained by a similarity-based procedure when the subjective similarity notion that is derived in a separate part of the experiment is used rather than the Euclidean distance.
Open Access
Games with switching costs and endogenous references
(Wiley, 2022-05-25) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one-player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε-equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.