Browsing by Author "Reiman, M. I."

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Economic models of sponsored content in wireless networks with uncertain demand
(Wiley, 2014-09-09) Andrews, M.; Özen, Ulaş; Reiman, M. I.; Wang, Q.; Management Information Systems; ÖZEN, Ulaş
This chapter evaluates an approach whereby the service provider can tap into an alternative source of revenue, originating from sales of advertisements or products and channelled by the content provider in the form of sponsorship of viewing. It presents a simple economic model in which service provider congestion costs, end user (EU) bandwidth costs, and the price that the content provider must pay for sponsoring content are all determined on a per-byte basis. A key feature of the model is that the content has uncertain demand. The chapter focuses on the relationship between the service provider and a single content provider. It also presents a numerical example to demonstrate how the optimization might work in practice. The chapter indicates how the results can be adapted for the case of EU quotas. In most current wireless data plans, the EUs pay a certain fee for a fixed quota of data.
Metadata only
Economic models of sponsored content in wireless networks with uncertain demand
(IEEE, 2013) Andrews, M.; Özen, Ulaş; Reiman, M. I.; Wang, Q.; Management Information Systems; ÖZEN, Ulaş
The interaction of a content provider with end users on an infrastructure platform built and maintained by a service provider can be viewed as a two-sided market. Content sponsoring, i.e., charging the content provider instead of viewers for resources consumed in viewing the content, can benefit all parties involved. Without being charged directly or having it counted against their monthly data quotas, end users will view more content, allowing the content provider to generate more advertising revenue, extracted by the service provider to subsidize its investment and operation of the network infrastructure. However, realizing such gains requires a proper contractual relationship between the service provider and content provider. We consider the determination of this contract through a Stackelberg game. The service provider sets a pricing schedule for sponsoring and the content provider responds by deciding how much content to sponsor. We analyze the best strategies for the content provider and service provider in the event that the underlying demand for the content is uncertain. Two separate settings are defined. In the first, end users can be charged for non-sponsored views on a per-byte basis. In the second we extend the model to the more common case in which end users purchase data quotas on a periodic basis. Our main conclusion is that a coordinating contract can be designed that maximizes total system profit. Moreover, the additional profit due to sponsoring can be split between the content provider and service provider in an arbitrary manner.