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dc.contributor.authorAkın, Özlem
dc.contributor.authorMarín, J. M.
dc.contributor.authorPeydro, J. - L.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-03T09:38:21Z
dc.date.available2021-03-03T09:38:21Z
dc.date.issued2020-04
dc.identifier.issn0266-4658en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/7357
dc.identifier.urihttps://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article-abstract/35/102/213/5862015?redirectedFrom=fulltext
dc.description.abstractBanking crises are recurrent phenomena, often induced by excessive bank risk-taking, which may be due to behavioural reasons (over-optimistic banks neglecting risks) and to conflicts of interest between bank shareholders/managers and debtholders/taxpayers (banks exploiting moral hazard). We test whether US banks' stock returns in the 2007-8 financial crisis are associated with bank insiders' sales of their own bank's shares in the period prior to 2006Q2 (the peak and reversal in real estate prices). We find that top-five executives' sales of shares predict bank performance during the crisis. Interestingly, effects are insignificant the sales of independent directors and other officers. Moreover, the top-five executives' impact is stronger for banks with higher exposure to the real estate bubble, where a one standard deviation increase of insider sales is associated with a 13.33 percentage point drop in stock returns during the crisis period. Finally, even though bankers in riskier banks sold more shares (furthering their own interests), they did not change their bank's policies, for example, by reducing bank-level exposure to real estate. The informational content of bank insider trading before the crisis suggests that insiders knew that their banks were taking excessive risks, which has important implications for theory, public policy and the understanding of crises, as well as a supervisory tool for early warning signals.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSpanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness ; European Research Council (ERC) ; Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness ; Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in RD
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Policy
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleAnticipating the financial crisis: evidence from insider trading in banksen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0003-2115-8416 & YÖK ID 234936) Akın, Özlem
dc.contributor.ozuauthorAkın, Özlem
dc.identifier.volume35en_US
dc.identifier.issue102en_US
dc.identifier.startpage213en_US
dc.identifier.endpage267en_US
dc.contributor.authorFemale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryArticle - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff


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