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Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
(Elsevier, 2020-08)
We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for "indivisible objects") are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially ...
On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion
(Springer, 2021)
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving ...
The role of real estate and gold as inflation hedges: the Islamic influence
(Emerald Publishing Limited, 2021-04-06)
Purpose
This paper aims to understand how aversion to interest income in Islam may influence the demand for real estate and gold when inflation is rampant.
Design/methodology/approach
According to Markowitz's ...
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
(Cambridge University Press, 2022-02)
In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can ...
On approximate Nash equilibria of the two-source connection game
(TÜBİTAK, 2022)
The arbitrary-sharing connection game is prominent in the network formation game literature [1]. An undirected graph with positive edge weights is given, where the weight of an edge is the cost of building it. An edge is ...
On optimal toll design for bosporus crossings
(Sosyoekonomi Society, 2022-10)
For many years, two toll bridges served commuter demand to cross the strait called Bosporus in Istanbul, Turkey. An underground connection called the Eurasian tunnel had been recently launched to relieve the strait's ...
Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proof
(Elsevier, 2024-01)
In the object reallocation problem, Ekici (2023) showed that Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is the unique rule that is strategyproof, individual-rational, and pair-efficient. We provide a short proof of this characterization result.
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
(Springer, 2020)
In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined ...
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