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An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
(Springer Science+Business Media, 2016-08)
The prominent mechanism of the recent literature in the assignment problem is the probabilistic serial (PS). Under PS, the truthful (preference) proÖle always constitutes an ordinal Nash Equilibrium, inducing a random ...
Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
(Elsevier, 2013-09)
We study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agentsʼ ex ...
Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
(Elsevier, 2020-08)
We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: n houses (stand for "indivisible objects") are to be allocated to n agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; k houses are initially ...
The Turkish appetite for gold: An Islamic explanation
(Elsevier, 2016-06)
A significant constituent of household wealth in Turkey is gold. Families accumulate gold especially on a variety of cultural occasions such as female-only gold days, circumcision feasts, and engagement and wedding ceremonies. ...
On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion
(Springer, 2021)
We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving ...
The role of real estate and gold as inflation hedges: the Islamic influence
(Emerald Publishing Limited, 2021-04-06)
Purpose
This paper aims to understand how aversion to interest income in Islam may influence the demand for real estate and gold when inflation is rampant.
Design/methodology/approach
According to Markowitz's ...
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
(Cambridge University Press, 2022-02)
In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can ...
Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proof
(Elsevier, 2024-01)
In the object reallocation problem, Ekici (2023) showed that Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is the unique rule that is strategyproof, individual-rational, and pair-efficient. We provide a short proof of this characterization result.
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
(Springer, 2020)
In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined ...
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