Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKara, G. I.
dc.contributor.authorÖzsoy, Satı Mehmet
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-30T13:15:35Z
dc.date.available2020-11-30T13:15:35Z
dc.date.issued2020-06
dc.identifier.issn0893-9454en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/7158
dc.identifier.urihttps://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/33/6/2554/5582662
dc.description.abstractWe examine the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations. Banks, not internalizing fire sale externalities, overinvest in risky assets and underinvest in liquid assets in the competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can alleviate the inefficiency, but banks respond by decreasing their liquidity ratios. When capital requirements are the only available tool, the regulator tightens them to offset banks' lower liquidity ratios, leading to fewer risky assets and less liquidity compared with the second best. Macroprudential liquidity requirements that complement capital regulations implement the second best, improve financial stability, and allow for more investment in risky assets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofThe Review of Financial Studies
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.titleBank regulation under fire sale externalitiesen_US
dc.typeReviewen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0002-9391-7859 & YÖK ID 124910) Özsoy, Mehmet
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖzsoy, Satı Mehmet
dc.identifier.volume33en_US
dc.identifier.issue6en_US
dc.identifier.startpage2554en_US
dc.identifier.endpage2584en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000536040500005
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/rfs/hhz117
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-85100846312
dc.contributor.authorMale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryReview - Institutional Academic Staff


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


Share this page