Spectrum trading for non-identical channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Type :
Conference paper
Publication Status :
published
Access :
restrictedAccess
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate spectrum trading via auction approach for cognitive radio networks. We consider a realistic valuation function in terms of different parameters for secondary users (SUs), and propose an efficient concurrent Vickrey-Clarke-Grove mechanism for non-identical channel allocation in two different scenarios. In the first scenario, SUs can bid for a single channel while in the other one, SUs can bid for a bundle of two channels. Our numerical results demonstrate significant revenue increase for the auctioneer and bidders in comparison with the conventional auction mechanisms.
Source :
Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), 2011 IEEE 22nd International Symposium on
Date :
2011
Publisher :
IEEE
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10679/417http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6139992
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