

# Collective Discussion: Movement and Carceral Spatiality in the Pandemic

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Various measures of mobility restrictions were introduced since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. This collective discussion examines them in relation to six different carceral techniques that govern movement: citizenship, nativism, colonialism, infrastructure, gender, and borders. We investigate how these spatializing techniques of carcerality have been modified and strengthened in the pandemic and their implications for how we conceptualize migration. Our conversation revolves around the relationality between movement and confinement to argue that they are not in opposition but work in tandem: Their meanings become interchangeable, and their relationship is reconfigured. In this collective discussion, we are interested in how to analyze movement/migration in ways that do not define the pandemic through temporal boundaries to mark its beginning and ending.

Différentes mesures visant à limiter les déplacements ont été mises en place à partir du début de la pandémie de Covid-19. Cette discussion collective les compare à six techniques carcérales qui régissent les mouvements : la citoyenneté, le nativisme, le colonialisme, l'infrastructure, le genre et les frontières. Nous examinons les modifications apportées à ces techniques carcérales de spatialisation et leur renforcement au cours de la pandémie, mais aussi leurs implications quand il s'agit de conceptualiser les migrations. Notre discussion tourne autour de la relationalité entre le mouvement et le confinement pour montrer qu'ils ne s'opposent pas,

mais fonctionnent par pair : leur signification devient interchangeable et leur relation se redéfinit. Dans cette discussion collective, nous nous intéressons à une analyse des mouvements/migrations qui ne définirait pas la pandémie par le biais de limites temporelles pour marquer son début et sa fin.

Desde la irrupción de la pandemia del COVID-19, se introdujeron varias medidas restrictivas en materia de movilidad. Este foro colectivo examina estas medidas en relación con seis técnicas diferentes, de carácter carcelario, que gobiernan la movilidad: ciudadanía, nativismo, colonialismo, infraestructura, género y fronteras. Investigamos cómo se han ido modificando y fortaleciendo estas técnicas «espacializadoras» de este aspecto carcelario durante la pandemia, así como sus implicaciones para la forma en que conceptualizamos la migración. Nuestro debate gira en torno a la relación entre la movilidad y el confinamiento con el fin de argumentar que estos no están en oposición, sino que trabajan de forma conjunta: sus significados se vuelven intercambiables y su relación se reconfigura. En este foro colectivo estamos interesados en como poder analizar la movilidad o la migración de una manera que no defina la pandemia a través de límites temporales, con el fin de poder marcar su comienzo y su final.

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### Reiko Shindo: Introduction

Gilles Deleuze (1994) suggests that ideas and thoughts emerge and develop through spatial arrangements. The mobility restrictions introduced since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic have indeed prompted various academic fields to rethink their key concepts, such as the “human” (Agamben 2021), “international relations” (Agostinis et al. 2021), and “fieldwork”<sup>1</sup> (the Center for Global Ethnography, Stanford University), from the perspective of movement/migration. In this collective discussion, a group of scholars from critical borders and migration studies, broadly defined, examine the spatial effect of the pandemic on the notion of movement/migration itself. In particular, we investigate how the existing spatializing techniques of carcerality have been modified and strengthened during the pandemic and their implications for the way we conceptualize migration. These carceral techniques include citizenship (Altan-Olcay and Balta), nativism (Van Houtum and Van Uden), colonialism (Rajaram), infrastructure (Coward), gender (Pellander), and borders (Huysmans).

We use what Moran et al. (2018) call “the diffuse carceral mode,” wherein the space of confinement is dispersed and exists beyond prisons, as an overall framework of discussion (see also Moran et al. 2013). For the purpose of this collective discussion, Moran et al.’s (2018) approach to carceral spatiality is useful because it challenges the binary opposition between movement and confinement. The carceral operates through “forms of confinement that burst internment structures and deliver carceral effects without physical immobilization” (Moral et al. 2013, 240). In other words, carceral spatiality goes beyond the “spatial fix” (Moran et al. 2018, 670) and is realized through “material, virtual, and imagined spaces” (Moran et al. 2018, 679). This approach to carceral spatiality prompts us to question the “blanket depiction of carcerality” (Altan-Olcay and Balta, this issue) that contrasts movements to various measures of mobility restrictions introduced during the pandemic. The authors of this collective discussion demonstrate that movement and carcerality are instead intertwined with each other. Through the analysis of different carceral techniques, we argue that movement and carcerality work in tandem: their

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<sup>1</sup>See “Doing Ethnography Remotely,” The Center for Global Ethnography, Stanford University. Available at <https://iriss.stanford.edu/doing-ethnography-remotely>.

meanings become interchangeable in some cases (e.g., Rajaram, this issue), and their relationships are reconfigured in other cases (e.g., Coward, this issue). Thus, the boundary between movement and carcerality is not fixed but in a state of flux. Some of us (Van Houtum and Van Uden, Coward, and Huysmans, this issue) discuss this intertwined relationship between movement and confinement more conceptually, while others do so with concrete policies (Altan-Olcay and Balta and Rajaram, this issue) and personal experiences (Pellander, this issue).

The circulation of the virus accelerates the movement of certain groups of people, while it stops or slows down others. Inequality is entrenched in these simultaneous workings of movement and confinement. Citizenship status and nationality allow the confinement of privileged groups of people to a secure space, be that a national territory or a home, but their confinement is made possible because of the continuous movement of underprivileged groups of people who perform the basic functions of society (Altan-Olcay and Balta and Pellander, this issue). Van Houtum and Van Uden (this issue) speak about the inequality between the privileged and the underprivileged in relation to affect. During the pandemic, nativism, or the affective obsession with national territories, spread beyond borders, failing to generate a more egalitarian response to the pandemic. The circulation of such affective obsession in turn confines people to the logic of what John Agnew (1994, 2017) calls the “territorial trap,” which constitutes the geographical assumption of politics based on the territoriality of states. Rajaram uses the phrase “Europe’s shadowy underbelly” to discuss the link between the problem of inequality and the colonial forms of extraction and exploitation, through which “spaces of freedom and mobility” are connected to “the unfreedoms and immobilization of others” (Rajaram, this issue). In other words, for some people, movement becomes confinement: to move within and to advanced capitalist countries, as migrant workers (Altan-Olcay and Balta and Rajaram, this issue) or migrant women (Pellander, this issue), is to remain confined to the existing conditions of inequality.

The simultaneous workings of movement and confinement also transform the relationship between the two. Coward (this issue) shows that the spatial confinement introduced during the pandemic relies on the intensification of the circulation of goods and information. This intensification reconfigures a form of life based on the territorial conceptualization of movement into “deterritorialized logistical life” characterized by “digital circulation *without* the movement of bodies” (Coward, this issue, original emphasis). In other words, bodily confinement is enfolded in digital movement. This suggests that the relationship between movement and confinement is not binary but derivative, one emerging out of the other. Huysmans calls the latter the “transversal” mode of thinking: lines and movements become one, moving “in relation to one another,” “creating densities, shocks... rather than as lines of separation that need to be crossed” (Huysmans, this issue).

Furthermore, the fractured and fluctuating boundary between movement and confinement broadens the category of migration. The existing body of research on the COVID-19 pandemic and mobility tends to discuss migrants (e.g., migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants) in relation to citizens (e.g., Guild 2020; Aradau and Tazzioli 2021; Bigo et al. 2021). This collective discussion contributes to this body of research by introducing a wider range of intersecting movements depending on citizenship status (Altan-Olcay and Balta; Van Houtum and Van Uden, this issue), family structure (Pellander, this issue), digital infrastructural condition (Coward, this issue), and the capitalism–labor relationship (Rajaram, this issue). The broader view of migration introduces new vocabularies to the debate about the pandemic and migration. They include knowledge—as scientific knowledge about vaccines (Altan-Olcay and Balta, this issue), age—in terms of the care of the elderly and young children (Pellander, this issue), love—as “agape, love for humankind” (Van Houtum and Van Uden, this issue), digital—as “digital mobilities without the movement of bodies” (Coward, this issue), and planet—as

“planetary conceptions of life” (Huysmans, this issue). These perspectives broaden existing vernaculars, such as security and humanitarianism (e.g., [Tazzioli and Stierl 2021](#)), in analyzing the relationship between the pandemic and migration.

The new vocabularies suggested in this collective discussion highlight the need for not only transdisciplinary research but also the analysis of the pandemic as what Tom [Lundborg \(2012\)](#) calls a “pure event,” an event without any clear beginning or ending. The view of the pandemic as a “pure event” or “a process of becoming” (Coward, this issue) is helpful in the case of COVID-19 because there is no clear “ending” of the pandemic. Not only the political response to the pandemic continues to change (e.g., [Radford and Yip 2023](#)), but also border policies introduced during the pandemic continue to exist in different forms to restrict the movement of people (e.g., [Shoichet 2023](#)). The analysis of a “pure event” requires resistance to definitiveness, or “the temptation to fall into urgent temporalities because it can lead to restricted analyses” (Rajaram, this issue). For this reason, the new vocabularies suggested by the authors of this collective discussion generate an analytical space for a “pure event.” Some (Coward and Huysmans, this issue) discuss the potentialities of these new vocabularies more explicitly than others.

The authors of this collective discussion shared drafts and exchanged comments to prepare our respective pieces, decentring each author’s voice in some way. We invite readers to be part of this decentring process by developing their own ways of engaging with this collective discussion. As such, we would like our interventions to produce nodes, virtual or physical, collective or individual, where we speculate and converse together in writing, reading, and talking. It is through such nodes of spatial and temporal disjuncture that we hope to explore the intellectual terrain of how movement/migration can be understood at the time of the pandemic.

### **Carceral Technique 1. Citizenship**

*Özlem Altan-Olcay and Evren Balta: Vaccinations, Politics of Mobility, and Global Inequalities—Citizenship and Passports during the Pandemic*

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, one contemporary debate in citizenship studies concerned the connections between national citizenship status and social transactions unconfined to territoriality ([Joppke 2019](#)). This discussion attends to inequalities between citizenship regimes across multiple, overlapping territorialities. Accordingly, those with passports from advanced capitalist countries in Europe and North America can access better life conditions in their countries of birth *and* move flexibly to other countries ([Van Houtum and Van Uden 2021](#); and this issue). In contrast, most people face insurmountable challenges both within their countries of residence *and* in terms of opportunities to migrate for better lives or to merely travel abroad ([Beck 2007](#)). This signals a new kind of global stratification (Mau 2010): In an age of transnationalism, national passports are unequal in terms of the rights and opportunities they provide both within and beyond state borders, dictating who can *and* who cannot move across borders, escape political and economic risks, and build lives elsewhere ([Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020](#)). Moran et al.’s conceptualization of the “diffuse carceral model” applies to nation-states and national borders, in this sense: National citizenship organizes and naturalizes a global inequality regime where most of the populations of the world are confined and restricted in their mobility, while holders of privileged passports are not. This is an uneven diffusion of carcerality informed by bordering practices of national citizenship regimes ([Van Houtum and Van Uden 2021](#); and this issue). And yet, in March 2020, this situation temporarily changed. As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, governments everywhere began advising and then requiring their citizens to stay at home, while people also had to remain in the countries they resided in. By April 2020, more than 90 percent of the world’s population lived in countries that restricted the entry of

non-citizens and non-residents, with 39 percent completely excluding “outsiders” (Connor 2020). As pictures of shuttered airports and empty city centers laid bare an immobility of colossal proportions, many began talking about a generalization of state carceral practices and population control, on the one hand, and the inability of the same states to mitigate the tremendous loss of human life as health systems neared collapse, on the other hand (Hughes 2020; Kenwick and Simmons 2020). Citizenship, we argue, offers an important conceptual lens to complicate these discussions. We propose that we need to retain our focus on inequalities across borders: specifically unequal access to health care across the world and accelerations in unequal mobility opportunities. In this sense, we want to contribute to discussions of bordering and borderism in this collection by focusing on the selective, arbitrary but intentional exercise of carcerality that borders become part of.

Hindess (2004) explains how citizenship is conceptualized as an institution that both reflects the commitment of states to universal rights *and* one that divides and renders the global human population governable within discrete, bounded territories. He argues that these two conceptualizations are distinct and possibly contradictory in contextually specific ways. The pandemic can perhaps inspire us to disentangle these contradictory directions by analyzing citizenship regimes in terms of the inequalities they entrench, whether between citizens and non-citizens or between citizens of countries in the Global North and Global South (Hindess 2000; Shachar 2009). Citizenship is a global regime that regulates the movement of human populations while naturalizing the fact that borders have always been far more carceral for some than others. In this essay, we draw out the initial rupture that introduced mobility restrictions everywhere, affecting populations, including in an unprecedented manner, also citizens of the countries in the Global North. We call this the decoupling of mobility and citizenship regimes, a pandemic-induced generalized state of affairs that momentarily called into question state-system’s power over human mobility. We then emphasize the retrenchment of pre-pandemic inequalities once widescale vaccination became a possibility in the Global North, through the concept of recoupling. We argue that post-vaccination practices of mobility are actually now more entrenched than ever in racialized and naturalized regimes of inequality between citizenships through discourses of public health.

As the authors of this contribution, educated in the United States but currently working in Turkey, we have been frequent travelers throughout our adulthood. We have written on the mobility advantages that certain citizenship statuses provide. This has been partially influenced by our own experiences as Turkish citizens, always scrambling for visas or knowing that our ability to move and settle elsewhere in the world is limited compared to citizens of countries in North America or Western Europe. And yet, come 2020, these experiences were momentarily equalized worldwide. As we witnessed the horrifying images of crumbling Western health systems, we felt lucky being “stuck” in a country whose health system initially appeared more resilient.

During the early months of the pandemic, being a citizen in an advanced capitalist country, once seen as a privilege because it offers mobility opportunities to escape any crisis, became irrelevant because everyone was territorially locked in. Each citizenship’s value was now, more than ever, pegged to the availability of adequate health care wherever you were “stuck.” Many advanced capitalist countries seemed to have woefully inadequate and unequal healthcare systems, exemplified in disastrous public policy responses to the pandemic (Dalglish 2020; Lohmeyer and Taylor 2021). The pandemic has also had impacts in struggling public education systems, mounting care labor at homes, stagnating economies, and loss of income (Schleicher 2020; Susskind and Vine 2020; Dlamini 2021). Thus, the appeal of Western citizenship was significantly weakened on both fronts: First, given the history of hegemonic neoliberal logics, not every advanced capitalist country’s welfare protection level matched its ranking on global wealth indices. Second, during

the pandemic, the benefits of these citizenship regimes became *decoupled* from the unequal mobility opportunities and global status they previously offered because nobody could move in or out of countries.

This situation was transformed, however, as the vaccination rollout began in 2021. According to the latest Our World in Data, 83 percent of residents in high-income countries have received at least one vaccine dose. This sits well with the widespread assumption churned in Western media today that the worst is behind us. Yet the picture changes when we look at low-income countries, where only 25 percent have received one dose as of the end of 2022. This figure, first of all, indicates a reversal of the initial failure of Global North healthcare systems while also providing a sharp reminder of tremendous global inequalities in vaccination opportunities and its correlation with citizenship and residence status. Second, those who were vaccinated by the spring of 2021, thanks to their wealthy governments hoarding internationally recognized vaccines, regained their transnational freedom of mobility much faster than most of the world's population (Hassoun and Herlitz 2021). Indeed, in the summer of 2021, many governments amended their border restrictions to allow in those who can prove they have been vaccinated. The vaccination rollout and the use of immunity passports to regulate people's mobility both inside and outside national borders meant that national citizenships and unequal possibilities for mobility across borders were *recoupled* and, therefore, entrenched even further. Nation-state borders once again became unyielding containers for the majority of the world's populations, who could neither access vaccines nor escape mounting health crises in the countries where they live.

Especially at the start of the pandemic, disabling the movement of bodies was necessary to contain the spread of the virus, which threatened the capacities of national healthcare systems. In this sense, we agree with Coward (this issue) when he argues against a simple logic of carcerality as defining the pandemic reality. He suggests instead that logistical life has been reconfigured by disabling certain types of mobilities (and exposures) while reshaping others. However, we would add another layer to this argument. The configuration of multi-layered mobility (and immobility) regimes is enmeshed with the histories of nation-state logics, citizenship regimes, and the inequalities undergirding both. Consequently, some can move across borders, whereas others cannot. Currently, where you fall on this continuum has as much to do with contemporary inequalities in vaccine access as the history of passports and visa regimes.

Public health concerns have been the mechanism through which national citizenship regimes and unequal possibilities for mobility have been *recoupled*. The "public" of public health was the nation, which needed protection from "viral others," through passport and visa regimes (Rushton 2019). Thus, the pandemic has reinforced existing hierarchies of border politics, but with a new emphasis on the free movement of the healthy body (Youde 2019; Jecker and Atuire 2021). Once again, it has to be emphasized that public health concerns can require temporary restrictions. However, as Van Houtum and Van Uden remark, this is an imaginary based on the absurd assumption that the virus will respect the thin pencil-lines drawn on maps (this issue). This is an effort to "contain" the virus by externalizing it, by assuming that it can be stopped at the border, rather than policy-making to develop domestic solutions (Kenwrick and Simmons 2020).

As Kenwrick and Simmons (2020) argue, pandemics are imbued with the politics of bordering. They argue that while there is no scientific consensus to justify these policies, they regenerate the already recognizable symbols and structures of border control. Indeed, several authors have written on how medico-legal border control has historically been a significant aspect of imagining the nation against colonial (and later post-colonial) others (Bashford 2004; Zylberman 2007). A logic that continues past coloniality, international diplomacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries worked on numerous treaties and established governance bodies to prevent

the spread of infectious diseases through the mobility of people and goods (Fidler 2001). Today's discourses of the "healthy body" reintroduce this logic of the "viral other," thereby helping to naturalize the links between global wealth inequalities (including access to vaccines) and unequal mobility chances based on citizenship status.

What makes this crisis worth reframing through citizenship logics is that this bordering politics does not exactly work in tandem with the scientific community that advocates restriction of mobility either. Instead, it builds more on control mechanisms against perceived or real threats at the borders and deeply entrenched racial discourses. These discourses are connected with imperial histories, distinguishing between European citizens and colonial subjects, and the construction of citizenship regimes that govern them in a differentiated manner, for example, by facilitating the free mobility of the former, while severely restricting that of the latter (Hindess 2004; Isin 2015). For example, as the Omicron COVID-19 variant was spreading, countries in Western Europe and North America almost immediately closed their borders to travelers from South Africa and several other southern African countries where the variant was first spotted (Zwi 2021). These mobility restrictions almost exclusively targeted African countries, although the new variant had already been detected in Europe and elsewhere. In the meanwhile, European countries have also deployed more restrictive asylum policies, which they justify in terms of public health concerns (Papamichail 2021). There is more. As of late 2022, the US government continues to require documentation of vaccination status or recovery from COVID-19 from non-citizen, non-resident travelers while not imposing the same for citizens and residents who are coming from abroad. While most restrictions have been lifted in the EU, these regulations are also frequently updated, leading travel websites to warn passengers to check entry conditions prior to traveling. These contemporary measures display an additional level of arbitrariness that entrenches and naturalizes the connection between citizenship status and whether mobility is a right or privilege for an individual.

Rajaram (this issue) asks wryly "on whose immobilisation does stability depend?" We suggest that, below the surface of public health concerns, is a history of political discourses and practices that discriminate against certain people by selectively restricting their mobility based on national citizenship status. This particular border politics is structured around a global regime of (im)mobility that, while influenced by disease outbreaks, also builds on and entrenches existing diverse legal statuses, global political economic inequalities, and racializing categories (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). Recognizing these links during times like this pandemic could allow us to move beyond a blanket depiction of carcerality or public health necessities in discussions of restrictions of movement. Instead, it might inspire political imaginaries that are reflexive about the logics with which policies of mobility *and* immobility select who to protect or marginalize.

Throughout this short note, we have focused on two functions of citizenship: national (welfare) provisions and transnational mobility opportunities. During the first period of the pandemic, in which everyone was locked down, the first function came to the fore while citizenship was decoupled from mobility opportunities. However, once vaccine passports were introduced, both welfare provision inequalities and transnational mobility inequalities between citizenship regimes were reinforced. In other words, the first phase of the pandemic resulted in a decoupling of citizenship and transnational mobility due to the leveling effects of compulsory confinement policies. Once the vaccination rollout began, there was a re-coupling that cemented systemic inequalities between citizenship regimes even further now providing additional justifications for arbitrary mobility controls.

It is under these conditions that during the later stages of the pandemic, some were able to escape crisis conditions due to the strength of their passports, whereas others remained confined in places not necessarily of their choosing; some were

able to argue for their freedom of mobility while turning a blind eye to the entrapment of the many. Huysmans in this issue reminds us that the pandemic has been as much about the imposition of limits to movement as a stark reminder that life is always in motion. We suggest that life-in-motion will always unfold in unequal ways because the controls attempted over it are differential and often have a lot to do with one's national citizenship status. No matter how global we say this crisis is, how we have gotten through it is not the same. In particular, our national citizenship status shaped significantly our individual and collective experiences and continues to do so in its aftermath.

### Carceral Technique 2. Nativism

*Henk Van Houtum and Annelies Van Uden: The Global Border Disorder and the Missed Momentum of COVID-19*

What a great opportunity it could have been. A pandemic of this urgency, impact, and scale, one that has affected all human beings one way or another, would have been the ideal event, as Huysmans (this issue) calls it, to overcome our differences and take firm steps toward ending global health inequalities. We may all be unique human beings and may be fond of our cultivated differences, but for a virus like this, we are all just anonymous vulnerable specimens of the same species. So, to swiftly and persistently coordinate, as humanity, irrespective of social standing, provenance, or wealth, the mitigating of the health effects and stamping out the virus would have been only commonsensical. It is painful and sad to ascertain that humanity has failed this test. Despite the many calls of the WHO and the UN to act and stand together in solidarity in a globalized world, as this would be the quickest, solidary, and safest way out, the dominant political response has instead been "our people first," a classic politics of nativism (Van Uden and Van Houtum 2020). So, what has been standing in the way of a responsible and sustainable path to a resilient immunization is, what Altan-Olcay and Balta powerfully referred to as, how we organized-and-naturalized (Altan-Olcay and Balta, this issue) national borders in our global society (Van Houtum 2021). Put differently, we are suffering from a *global border disorder*, a naturalized incarceration of "us" and "them" in native boxes, that has demonstrated to be counterproductive to a responsible, equal, and sustainable dealing of the COVID event (Bueno Lacy and Van Houtum 2013).

Let us explain what we mean here. To start off, that we have carved up the world in state borders, imaginary and limited as it may be, is not the main problem per se. Yet, what it makes it problematic, both ethically as well as pragmatically, is how these borders between people have become *naturally* "rooted," essentialized, and morally normalized. The dominant and normalized bordering principle in the world of today is a division of humanity along nativist lines of blood and soil (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002). Newborns in the bordered states, the ones that would be typified as "*natives*," are dominantly seen as "natural" *members* of the political community by virtue of their ties to the soil or blood of the community (*ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*). If people are imagined to be the "natural" inhabitants of the imagined geopolitical community where they were born, then it implies that Others are seen as *unnatural* newcomers. This politically constructed Other as a historically and spatially different kind of human being is typically co-constituted by socially constructed biopolitical imaginations and sometimes blunt discriminations of non-member phenotypes of the Others, expressed in imagined-and-therefore-real concepts like ethnicity, color, and race. These are the not-our-people people, the non-"natives," the human beings who are seen as strange, as strangers, or as aliens, who are typically subjected to integration and assimilation policies, citizenship tests, and in the case of full membership, and, tellingly, a "naturalization" (as if it is a re-birth) ritual. This nativist naturalization of a constructed We into static, fixed containers,



aply called *states*, coupled with the “unnaturalization” and alienation of non-natives has problematically produced, what could be termed, a *borderism*. By this, we mean the ideology that essentializes and politicizes the value of human beings on the basis of the bordered (id)entity they are born into, reside in, and/or travel from (Van Houtum 2021). This borderism has become institutionalized in the visa border regime, where the freedom to travel is made dependent on a nativist “birth right lottery” (Shachar 2009; Van Houtum 2010), determined by one’s blood or soil ties to a state. This, in turn, has created nativist *paper prisons*, in which the freedom to travel has become dependent on the power of one’s passport (Van Houtum and Van Uden 2021). And clearly, some paper cages are more equal than others. For example, the global ranking of mobility based on passports is heavily skewed in favor of affluent states, which has de facto created a global aristocracy, principally determined by birth, who, in return, are champions in locking in and excluding those who are imagined to be a threat to their affluence and culture, the global underclass. This, in effect, has provoked a morbid smuggling industry for the global expendables from less affluent states, resulting in many deaths at the EU and US borders, and a posh golden visa system for the global elite from these states who are buying “golden” passports (Van Houtum and Van Uden 2021; see also Altan-Olcay and Balta, this issue). What is more, borderism has proven to be a breeding ground for all sorts of complacent nationalisms, xenophobic prejudices, scapegoating discourses, as well as inhuman and illegal border practices (Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2020).

#### *COVID-19 and the Normalization of Borderism*

The consequences of this prevailing borderism, this discriminatory ideology grounded on nativistic state containers, in the global event of COVID-19 have been as multifold as harmful. For example, the resulting virus containment measures, like herd immunity policies, track-and-trace, or lock-downs, were not primarily focused on the fate of human beings per se, but, without further explanation or questioning, started from the premise of the own state and also, by and large, myopically ended with the borders of the state, without taking international cooperation or international mobility rights into much account (see also Huysmans, this issue). Also, in the many speeches that presidents and prime ministers held to announce yet another technocratically decided state-of-exception measurement, the international collaboration, let alone the globally differentiated vulnerabilities, were only scarcely, if ever, given attention. The political response has been dominantly national and inward-looking, paradoxically virtue-signaled under the flag of solidarity and togetherness (Van Uden and Van Houtum 2020). Moreover, the policies were technocratically exceptionalized from international democratic consultation, and the exceptional authoritarian dismantling of national democracy in the name of “our own protection” was normalized. At the same time, the beyond-the-own-border was exceptionalized, seen as an “alien” space, a possibly dangerous potency that should be contained. Fitting with this nationalized, protectionist response was the widespread geographic naming and shaming of the origin of the virus (Chinese virus, etc.), an obsession with the trustworthiness of and hygiene of foreign bodies (including a discrimination of Chinese travelers). In the same vein, far-right populists like Trump and Orban claimed that the spread of COVID-19 would be the fault of the cosmopolitan elite, foreigners, and imaginatively open borders (Chung and Li 2020; Devakumar et al. 2020; White 2020), a creeping development that could be described as *pan-populism*. This banal borderism was often coupled with a persistent war language, expressed in terms like invasion, invisible enemy, battle, combat, “front line” warriors, and soldiers (health-care personnel) (Schinkel 2021). It is a patriotist border discourse that we, apart from international war fares, are also seeing in the “war on terror,” the “war on drugs,” and in the case of irregular migration (Musu 2020).

Tellingly, most states bluntly and unilaterally bolstered their border controls and banned international travel, in order to exclude and deport asylum-seekers as well as take away freedom of mobility of many migrant workers and tourists (except those with private jets). As if this borderism would be self-evident, morally unproblematic, or even the only or most logical thing to do in the case of a pandemic in a globalized world with a multiplicity of transversal mobility “foldings” (see Huysmans, this issue). The largely unquestioned banality of the national frame was only further accentuated by the introduction of so-called “immunity passports” or “vaccination passports.” The normalized-*and*-naturalized logic of state protectionism in the pandemic thereby turned into a nationalistic border surveillance of biometric bordering. And this particularly has gone at the expense of the health and international mobility of people in less affluent states who could/cannot afford the expensive vaccines. And that these were expensive was largely the result of a prevailing health-care capitalistic regime, in which the distribution of healthcare is marketized and consequently largely left to a vulgar competition. When it comes to the necessary medical supplies, we have seen a global grabbing and hoarding race, sometimes even leading to wild west scenes, for supplies like mouth masks, tests, respiration devices, and vaccines, in which even state piracy was not shunned. What is more, protected by their host countries, because “the free market could not be disturbed” (Rijksoverheid 2021), pharmaceutical companies as well as traders in medical supplies acted as pandemic profiteers by shamelessly pushing their monopoly rents to simply outrageous levels, knowingly exploiting and aggravating the global wealth inequalities and deadly vaccine apartheid (Van Uden and Van Houtum 2020; Van Enk, Van Houtum, and Van Uden, 2023). It is exemplary of what Banerjee has termed “necro-capitalism,” as it is an accumulation regime that triggers grabbing and hoarding, even leading to vaccine wastages while creating global wastelands and sacrificing the lives of Others as expendables or wasted lives (Bauman 2003; Banerjee 2008; Coward and Rajaram, this issue). In short, the result of, what has been flagged as a pandemic, a global crisis for humanity, for which global “solidarity and togetherness” is needed, has, instead, bolstered the repressive and violent deployment of state borders, sparked off panpopulism, intensified the dehumanization of asylum seekers and the global poor, increased the likelihood of virus mutations and in return reduced the efficacy of the existing vaccines and lengthened the pandemic, amplified economic disparities and necro-capitalism, and further increased the global mobility apartheid (Van Houtum 2010; Van Houtum and Bueno Lacy 2020).

### *Pan/patri-demos*

It has become painfully evident that even in an urgent and truly global crisis like this the alignment of national policies and global coordination in health care have seriously failed. The dominant paradigm amidst one of the worst global crises for humanity in a long time has been: our people first. And this shameless borderism was not seen as a problem, but presented even technocratically prescribed as a solution, a virtue-signaling way of the crisis, neglecting the paradoxical nature of national confinement in the case of a global pandemic. While it is sensible to expect states to act in the interest of their own citizens, in the case of a pandemic, the responsible and sustainable action would obviously have been to collaborate internationally. Not only out of solidarity with the other equally and/or even worse affected members of the own species, but even or also out of self-interest for the people defined as ours.

It is almost as if the word pandemic, coming from *pandēmos* (in which *pan* means “all” and *dēmos* stands for “people”) for most political leaders of nation-states was never really taken for what it is, a global threat affecting all people (Van Enk, Van Houtum, and Van Uden, 2023). Two or more centuries of naturalization of the

state as the dominant model to organize the world has clearly done its work, even when it is clear that a uniquely state-centric view is falling short, let alone solidary, sustainable, and responsible. Apparently, the concept of people, perhaps even more so in these populist times, has become “naturally” reduced to a globally carved out small selection of it, the own people. In other words, how in this pandemic the *panḗmos* has become degraded to what could be termed *patrídēmos* (“people” of the “native land”).

#### *Beyond the Global Border Disorder*

The outbreak of this virus, which has been occupying humanity for more than 3 years already now, will not be the last of its kind. New global solidarity and coordination tests will arise, and some might even be more demanding than COVID-19, be in the form of a new virus or in the shape of global climate change. Rather than only a discussion on epidemiological parameters and the social and economic impact of governmental containment measurements, what is demanded is nothing less than a structural reform of the organized-*and*-naturalized governance structure of our global world. Because it became painfully clear that this *borderism* has had morbid and self-harming effects on humanity.

A virus like COVID-19 does not respect the thin, mythical pencil-lines on the maps that the political leaders of nation-states often conceive or dream of as thick and invincible walls that would keep the world outside (Van Houtum 2021). For a rhizomatic virus, there is no foreign; there are no Others. The normalized and naturalized root-based b/ordering and othering discriminated and divided solidarity along the lines of blood-and-soil connections, turned the imaginary pencil-lines on the map into judgmental fault-lines and deathscapes, trapped people in a feudal lottery of birth, shamelessly bolstered a fallacious *patrídēmic* response of “our people first,” and thus missed the *pan*-solidarity and *pan*-democracy needed to overcome the *pan*demic. To counter this global border disorder, what is demanded is to reform how humanity perceives humanity and to finally take the *pan* in *pan*demic seriously (Buono Lacy and Van Houtum 2013; Schinkel 2021). The normative foundation of such development could be a global health approach based on what the Greeks called, *agape*, love for humankind, which looks at humanity, independent of age, origin, wealth, or social standing (Van Uden and Van Houtum 2020). The vulnerable interdependence of humanity, which has become even more apparent during this corona crisis, is hence also an opportunity for a reimagination of the merits as well as necessities of its global interconnectedness. Seen in this way, perhaps then, what a great opportunity this crisis still can be.

### **Carceral Technique 3. Colonialism**

*Prem Kumar Rajaram: Historicizing the Pandemic*

It is important to take a long view on the pandemic and on its impacts on different people and places. Academics can fall in with the rush to comment, and this occurs particularly around moments of “crisis.” “Crises,” however, are not given to immediate analysis not least because of the possibility of getting caught up in a temporality of present-focused emergency. The drama of the pandemic tends to occupy mindsets as well as concrete policies. It is difficult for policy to do otherwise, but academics should resist the temptation to fall into urgent temporalities because it can lead to restricted analyses.

Crisis may be seen as the politics of others suddenly emergent, upsetting carefully laid out plans for political, economic, and social “stability.” A crisis is a time out of joint and is opposed to stability. We may ask, however—and we have historical reasons for doing so—on whose restrictions on mobility—actual mobility as well

as social, political, and economic—is “stability” built on? Or, put another way, on whose immobilization does stability depend?

Responses to crises are familiar because they are policies, tactics, and strategies that are used to control the mobility and social reproduction of subalterned others. The reproduction of social and financial inequality requires the control of the social reproduction of others so that they may serve the interests of an elite (as disposable migrant labor, for example), or because “others” need to be visibly excluded to foster citizens’ acceptance of unequal distributions of wealth and social privilege (as Roma, migrants, and other racialized minorities in Europe are; Pellander reminds us in this issue that marginality intersects with gender, race, and class). For these reasons, the control of mobility remains in the toolbox of the contemporary state in Europe.

The COVID-induced immobilization experienced by both citizens and others in Europe showed the arbitrariness of the right to mobility, and that the freedoms of the European citizen were not freely granted by a liberal contract but sanctioned by an authority on specific conditions. Such freedoms to the extent that they exist for some were, of course, borne of working-class struggles over the course of the twentieth century, and they are limited and defined by the limits, failures, and successes of those struggles.

Mobility is allowed, even affirmed and encouraged, to the extent that it builds the authorized community of European citizens, but assisting migrant mobility on the basis of another idea of solidarity is criminalized. The idea that law has hegemonic functions in serving the interests of an elite is far from new, and thinking about the pandemic and its management helps us to identify the mystifications on which that hegemony is built. As Huysmans in this issue notes that the pandemic invites transversal thinking to make the familiar unfamiliar.

Hegemony works in part by mystifying the origins of things. Freedom of movement and relative equality are said to be “European values,” rather than hard-won rights (Cantat 2016). This mystification deflects: Citizenship is seen as a celebration of “European values” rather than a political practice of contention and vigilant attention.

The imposition of emergency rules during pandemics can help us see through this mystification. Immobilization due to lockdowns impacted worse on migrants than on citizens because of the precarity that working-class migrants experience in Europe. The pandemic led to a sense—sometimes mere rhetoric, sometimes heart-felt, and sometimes backed up by political attention—of a common humanity. Early on, the vaccination drive in Europe was hampered by the commercial logistics that have come to define public policy. The logistical imagination’s just-in-time delivery of goods and services maps a network that does not automatically take in the cloistered camps and holding centers of asylum seekers, nor the clandestine spaces that migrants must find shelter in Europe. Even after the vaccine-delivery logistics were adjusted to take into account these marginal spaces, the embedded inequalities caused by official immobilization, social marginalization, and clandestine movement have meant an inequality of access to information about vaccines. Coward in this issue takes note of the way in which infrastructure map and connects a space, transforming it into a knowable territory, and, as a consequence, enabling the pretence that those without infrastructure connectedness are somehow unconnected, rather than consciously disconnected.

Migrant workers in Europe are, of course, subject to a specific logistical imagination, one that allows extraction of bodypower and is premised on their disposability as clandestine people. Sandro Mezzadra argues that the economic disruptions in the West since the 1970s have led to the development of new enclosures, intensive spaces of production populated by disposable surplus bodies. These spaces of highly extractive and intimately intrusive production require mobile, replaceable,

and immobilizable bodypower, matched by a logistical mapping that enables both immobilization and extraction (Mezzadra 2011).

While Mezzadra argues that these enclosures are contemporary, they are not new. These spaces of hyper-exploitation of labor resonate with capitalist colonial enclosures, like highly regulated tea and rubber plantations in colonial India and Malaya sucking value from bodies and then dispensed with; or in urban arrangements where segregation and immobilization made labor power accessible, exploitable, controllable and cloisterable. Paying attention to the connections between colonialism of the nineteenth century and contemporary political-economic arrangements is an important corrective to liberal accounts of the emergence of capitalism that seek to somehow cloister it from the labor exploitation and value drain of the wealth of colonies (Rajaram 2016; Patnaik and Patnaik 2017). The cultural and economic cheapening of labor power to facilitate the production of immense surplus value and its extraction was worked out most starkly in the nineteenth-century colony and remains in the toolkit of European state-capital collusions, and this becomes most evident in times of “crises.”

Faced with increasing costs of production, capitalist production has over time consistently sought to cheapen the bodypower of its laborers. This is done through social and economic innovation—free trade zones and the workers’ dormitories that prop these up; legislation that ensures the availability of cheap labor; backdoor migration pathways that enable agrarian industries in Europe; zero-hour contracts; and other spatial, legal, and social strategies to cheapen, immobilize, dispense, and replace bodypower. It is this cheapened body power that serves as the backbone of the European agriculture and care industries.

The European Commission estimates that about 13 percent of “key workers” in Europe are migrants. These are individuals whose work was exceptionally allowed during pandemic immobility with some restrictions. In a report on these key workers in the agriculture and care sectors in Europe, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) write:

Low pay, exploitative employment, and non-existent alternatives perpetuate migrant workers’ precariousness and prevent their long-term social mobility. All this takes place at the same time as the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, which has made clear to wide sections of the public how critical low-status migrant workers are to the functioning of key economic sectors and public infrastructures in EU countries, including the agriculture and care sectors (FEPS 2022, 8).

The FEPS report can be read as an acknowledgment of Europe’s shadowy underbelly—the violence, inequality, and immobilization on which Europe and its mystifications depend.

FEPS also highlights the segregated and overcrowded housing that enables the cloistering of labor power. Overcrowding is a key vector of COVID transmission. Europe has a choice to make between the availability of cheap labor living clandestinely and invisibly (and thus hard to reach in a crisis) and controlling pandemic transmission. This may be seen as a tension between a humanitarian impulse to protect people and the regimes of exploitation that lead to migrant workers occupying hard to reach clandestine spaces.

These contradicting modes of relating to cheapened labor have resonances with colonial capitalism. Indeed, it may be said that cognizance of Europe’s shadowy underbelly points to contemporary Europe’s deep imbrication with tactics of extraction, exploitation, and devaluation figured out most starkly in its colonies.

In a tuberculosis epidemic in the early twentieth century in British-ruled Kuala Lumpur, the disease ravaged overcrowded workers’ tenements. The Resident Surgeon wrote urgently in 1912 that “deaths from pulmonary tuberculosis reflects the necessity for increased housing accommodation in KL” (Malay Mail 1912). The majority of deaths from tuberculosis and pulmonary disease were among the rickshaw

pullers. In his history of rickshaw coolies in Singapore, James Francis Warren writes that pulmonary tuberculosis, unknown in that city before the end of the nineteenth century, “was the characteristic disease of the crowded vermin-ridden slums of the rickshaw coolies” (Warren 2003, 270). The medical data and surveys of the Kuala Lumpur Resident Surgeons emphasize repeatedly that tuberculosis was found almost exclusively in the crowded tenements where rickshaw pullers lived, their sickness exacerbated by the lung-destroying immense physical work of pulling rickshaws (Rajaram 2016). The British Resident resisted spending money on improving housing conditions and general hygiene in outlying parts of the town and in buildings housing housing coolie laborers until after 1912 when labor riots forced the administration’s hand.

In this short piece, I have tried to cast a long view on COVID. The responses to the pandemic help us to see the shadowy underbelly of Europe and the way its spaces of freedom and mobility are connected to the unfreedoms and immobilization of others. Altan-Olcay and Balta in this issue build on this, connecting to how regimes of citizenship regulate mobility, and by necessity, immobility.

For myself, encountering the pandemic has been surreal in the same way it has for all of us relatively comfortable and safe in Europe. To deal with the surreal is perhaps the luxury of the relatively safe. I noticed, as did many others, the invisibilizing of migrant experience during times of COVID. I became a citizen of a European state during COVID, with an increased right to travel, very handy as my institution moved, and I had to travel in trains between Austria and Hungary. I worried about my family far away and heard of deaths and sickness. I doom-scrolled like everyone else until it all got too much. But it became important, at some point, to look outward from where I and my family were, to see what this tells us about Europe and Europeanness and about what the longing for travel tells us about ourselves, the connections given to us, and the disconnections imposed on us.

#### **Carceral Technique 4. Infrastructure**

*Martin Coward: Logistical Life and the Politics of Exposure in the COVID Pandemic*

##### *Disruption, Infrastructure, Confinement*

As the initial wave of the global COVID-19 pandemic gathered pace around me in spring of 2020, the UK government issued a stay-at-home order. Measures such as this were seen as a disruptive confinement. This sense of disruption can be seen in the impact of pandemic responses on transport infrastructures. For example, in the United Kingdom, the volume of car and goods vehicle journeys on the roads declined by up to 75 percent and passenger journeys by rail by over 90 percent (UK Department of Transport 2020). Likewise, according to the International Air Transport Association, passenger flights declined by 90 percent and freight by 30 percent (OECD 2020).

The pandemic thus foregrounded the role of infrastructure as the “connective tissue. . .of the public realm” (Muschamp 1994). Throughout modernity, infrastructure has been seen as the force that created the sense of common space—particularly the nation-state. Whether it is roads, rails, wires, or pipes, the idea that the state comprises a unified territorial space is predicated on the interconnection of many localities into a common territorial space by infrastructure (Coward 2016, 9). The disruption of such infrastructures thus exemplified the sense that the interconnective tissue that shapes our sense of shared space was being dissolved.

In response to this sense of the decomposition of common space and the severing of interconnective links, Giorgio Agamben (2021, 19) argued that “physical presence. . .will be preemptively confined to the private sphere and to the enclosure of domestic walls” and that “[w]hat is at stake is nothing less than the abolition of public space.” As a consequence, Agamben argued “[o]ur fellow man has been abol-

ished” (Benvenuto 2020).<sup>2</sup> Measures such as stay-at-home orders and travel bans were seen as “carceral logics of quarantine” (Hughes 2020) or the emergence of a “carceral spatiality” (Moran et al. 2018, 679).

The idea of confinement or carceral space is predicated on a particularly territorial opposition of common, infrastructurally connected space with atomized bounded spaces. Both motifs, however, construe space in a territorial, volumetric sense whether it is knitted together by infrastructure, or defined by the boundaries of the home or state. Here we might say with Van Houtum and Van Uden (this issue) that both conceptions are defined by a borderism that has internalized, normalized, and moralized the territorially carved-up organization of the earth. This territorial conception of space shares much with Huysmans’s characterization of static, territorial understandings of politics as “a sedentary conception of life” in which “[m]ovement is the secondary phenomena.” For such a sedentary conception, stay-at-home orders were a stilling of that secondary phenomenon of movement as bodies were confined at rest.

In this short note, I want to argue that seeing responses to the pandemic through the lens of territorial confinement fails to fully grasp the politics of pandemic response. Instead of seeing the disruption of infrastructure in a solely territorial-spatial register, I want to argue that we should see it as an instance of the reconfiguration of logistical life. I will argue that the reconfiguration of infrastructural interconnection in the pandemic led to the emergence of two parallel modes of logistical life, each with its own exposure to others (and thus, for some, to harm). Here, I want to underscore Altan-Olcay and Balta’s discussion of the differential mobilities of the pandemic and “move beyond a blanket depiction of carcerality” and “inspire political imaginaries that are reflexive about the logics with which policies of mobility *and* immobility select who to protect or marginalize” (Altan-Olcay and Balta, this issue). Indeed, a preoccupation with territorial and spatial confinement fails to grasp the politics of logistical life in the time of the pandemic.

### *Two Modes of Logistical Life*

Logistical life (Reid 2006, 20) is a function of infrastructure. It is because infrastructure creates the sense of a single unified territorial space across which people and objects can move with coordination that we have a sense of efficiency (traversing the territory in with minimum effort/time), communication (projecting representations across space), and positioning (being able to cite the place of a person or object relative to the conduits of infrastructure—street addresses, industrial estates, and so on). It is precisely this logistical life that was disrupted by pandemic responses. The sense that the conduits of logistical life were being blocked, mobility arrested, and interconnections undone, led to the sense that logistical life as a territorial infrastructural assemblage was being atomized and parcelled into bounded spaces of confinement. From the perspective of being confined to the home, restricted to a small territorial parcel, and watching transport conduits emptied and borders hardened, there was a sense that both national spaces were unbundled from its global networks and divided up as interconnections were severed. We can refer to the logistical life disrupted in this way as *territorial*. The disruption of territorial logistical life is experienced as a carceral logic in which the territories constituted by infrastructural interconnection are disaggregated into smaller, bounded, exclusionary units (the global disaggregated into states, the state disaggregated into neighborhoods and domestic spaces).

And yet, confined to the home and unable to travel, for many, the experience was not a disruption of territorial logistical life, but of its reconfiguration. From digital interconnection to online shopping, interconnection clearly did not simply

<sup>2</sup>In Agamben (2021), this phrase is translated as “Our neighbour has been abolished.” Benvenuto, however, chooses “fellow man.” The original is “Il nostro prossimo è stato abolito” (Agamben 2020).

disappear (Comscore 2021). Indeed, for many, interconnection was intensified by digital technologies that were constitutive of improvised forms of working and sociality (Ofcom 2021). As we moved to teaching and staying in touch with family via video platforms and ordering food and goods to the door via online shopping platforms, it became clear that territorial logistical life was being reconfigured into a virtualized, informational form. We could call this *detrterritorialized* logistical life.

Deterritorialized logistical life is constituted by infrastructures that enable digital circulation without movement of bodies. Where territorial logistical life is predicated on the circulation of bodies and goods across territorial space, deterritorialized logistical life is predicated on digital circulation *without* the movement of bodies. Deterritorialized logistical life is not less material—it rests on the circulation of data through fibers, the operation of servers, and transport of goods through road networks. Indeed, both territorial and deterritorialized logistical life run through material infrastructures distributed in territorial space. These material infrastructures—roads, pipes, wires, and cables—are subject to common logics of governance (such as sovereignty) and ownership (such as corporate control). For example, states govern road distribution networks and corporations own and control undersea internet cables.

However, for territorial logistical life, mobility across territory is the aim (from home to office, from one town or country to another, and so on), whereas for deterritorialized logistical life, informational mobility is the goal. Deterritorialized logistical life is thus an intensification of digital circulation at a time when the territorial mobility of many bodies has been disrupted. Homeworkers are the prime example—circulating in informational space while their bodies were confined to the home. As I taught from my home while my children learned from our front room, we experienced this intensification of a deterritorialized logistical life.

A focus on the carceral spaces of confinement generated by the disruption of territorial logistical life fails to grasp this intensification of another, deterritorialized logistical life. The latter erodes boundaries, facilitates interconnection, and intensifies digital mobilities without the movement of bodies through territorial spaces. It would be a mistake to think, therefore, that the disruption of territorial logistical life means that it has been put in question or eroded. Rather, in the moment of confinement, logistical life found another, deterritorialized way to capitalize on the material infrastructures that carry and compute data to maintain its efficiencies, communication, and positioning.

### *The Politics of Exposure*

The two modes of logistical life I have identified represent different modes of exposure and vulnerability. On the one hand, territorial logistical life is characterized by an exposure of the bodies circulating through infrastructures to the viral pathogens that inhabit its atmospheres. Here, it should be noted that despite the perception that territorial logistical life was disrupted, for a segment of the population daily navigation of its conduits remained an unavoidable aspect of their life (here see [Aradau and Tazzioli \(2021\)](#) on “urban borders”). Particularly for those workers whose roles were perceived to require physical presence, exposure to the viral atmosphere of infrastructural conduits—especially public transport—remained a daily experience ([Nafilyan et al. 2021](#)). While the perception was of confinement to the home, a segment of the workforce was exposed regularly to both other bodies and COVID atmospheres in a way that Agamben’s characterization of the pandemic as a moment in which public space was abolished simply cannot recognize. Here, it is clear that the humanitarian impulse toward confinement was aimed largely at a privileged group of workers able to capitalize on the mobility afforded by deterritorialized logistical life. Indeed, this exposes the way in which the humanitarian impulse of the stay-at-home order was undercut by the necessity for “essential” workers—often



low-paid—to remain mobile and traveling to and from work. Moreover, as Rajaram (this issue) notes, the pandemic highlighted the way in which such essential workers are normally invisible. By forcing their territorial mobility at a moment where many were required to stay at home, the vulnerability of such key workers was highlighted.

On the other hand, those who experienced deterritorialized logistical life were exposed in a different way. Firstly, their social relations were intensified, exposing them to more others, and more relations, than they had ever been before. Online contacts multiplied as it was realized that telepresence frees individuals from the constraints of physical presence. As an academic, for example, I experienced being able to give seminars, guest lectures, and join meetings in a way that the physical constraints of travel and time would have previously prevented. Secondly, the subjects of deterritorialized logistical life were exposed to an intensification of the capitalist imperative in what was previously regarded as the home. Deterritorialization made the dining room table a place of work, exposing the home to imperatives of capitalist circulation such as the erosion of the distinction between the time of work and leisure time (Palumbo 2020). The dining room and the Zoom call are thus, as Rajaram (this issue) notes (citing Mezzadra), the new enclosures of the capital relations of deterritorialized logistical life. While the erosion of the home/work distinction is not new, the intensification of the exposure of the worker to the demands of work through deterritorialized logistical life is a particular outcome hidden by narratives of confinement and “getting back to work.”

It should be noted here that I have opposed the territorial and deterritorialized forms of logistical life in such binary terms for analytic purposes. Here, the goal is to show that reading the pandemic through a carceral logic fails to grasp the way in which logistical life was reconfigured by what Huysmans calls the “COVID-19 pandemic” event. In reality—as I have shown in relation to essential workers—the experience was much more variegated—with, as Pellander shows in this issue, intersectional “(im)mobilities that are tied to other categories such as race, class, nationality” and gender. Moreover, as Pellander shows, the reconfiguration of logistical life toward homeworking was gendered and had uneven effects on family relationships. As such, beyond the heuristic opposition of territorial and deterritorialized logistical life as a way of contesting the carceral frame, a more nuanced investigation of the intersectional hierarchies and exploitations of logistical life during a pandemic is needed.

To fully appreciate the politics of pandemic response, therefore, we need to move beyond narratives of disruption and restoration, confinement, and freedom. Indeed, we need to move beyond narratives that view the task of pandemic response as being the repair of disruption and the return to the *status quo ante*. Such narratives fail to grasp the way in which logistical life was not simply disrupted but rather bifurcated into territorial and deterritorialized forms. In this sense, the pandemic is what Lundborg (2012) would refer to as a pure event, not a historical event. The historical event is constituted by a clear boundary of before and after, while the pure event is a process of becoming. The carceral account of the pandemic as historical is framed by an opposition between a before time characterized by mobility and an afterward characterized by confinement. In contrast, the account I have given here proposes a process of bifurcation and intensification in which logistical life is in a process of becoming. In this pure event, the territorial and de-territorial are entangled in ways that the simple before–after account of the pandemic as a carceral event cannot fully comprehend.

Pandemic responses reveal the way in which logistical life is in the process of becoming more than territorial. Indeed, pandemic responses leveraged infrastructure to create new forms of digital mobility. As such, deterritorialization is logistical life becoming “able to move when and where one is told to” under conditions where territorial mobility is disrupted (Reid 2006, 20). And yet, a focus on the latter, on confinement, leads us to think that a humanitarian impulse has brought about a

temporary halt to mobility. Rather, as I have shown, mobilities continue through the disruption and multiply the ways in which we are exposed—not just to COVID, but also to capital. In thinking then about the differential mobilities that inhere to infrastructures, we can see the politics of exposure that attend to different modes of logistical life.

### **Carceral Technique 5. Gender**

*Saara Pellander: Relational Flows of Family Ties—Spatial Perspectives on Transnational Intimacies, Gender, and Restrictions of Movement*

Gender is one of the central social distinctions structuring mobilities and immobilities. Gender does not operate in isolation, but is entangled with hierarchies of (im)mobilities that are tied to other categories such as race, class, nationality, and, especially in relation to the pandemic, health and access to healthcare. I will explore questions of transnational care relations in family settings as well as family separation as an example to illustrate this point as an example of diffused carcerality (Moran et al. 2018). As care work, both unpaid and paid, tends to be female-dominated, a focus on transnational care and families brings out some of the intersectional hierarchies of restrictions of (transnational) movement and carceral confinement. Furthermore, I discuss the ways in which the COVID pandemic has exacerbated gendered hierarchies of (im)mobilities and how the gendered nature of (im)mobilities tends to be ignored when states design policies that restrict movement for some, while enabling it for others. This is not a new phenomenon, but, as with other inequalities, exceptional situations such as the pandemic bring out existing dividing lines stressing them even further.

If the carceral is relative (Moran et al. 2018), so are mobility and immobility (see Adey 2006) and the way in which restrictions of movements operate along intersectional dividing lines. Looking at the pandemic and its effects on restrictions to mobility, it becomes clear that the ways cross-border mobility is planned rests on assumptions of travelers who can afford the forms of travel that are allowed and controlled. As Rajaram as well as Altan-Olcay and Balta point out in their contributions, the access to healthcare, access to vaccines, and access to necessary travel documents is reserved to a very limited part of the population, immobilizing across racial and colonial lines.

Racialized hierarchies of governing cross-border movements are highly gendered themselves. There are numerous examples of governing cross-border mobilities from a gender perspective from the past and present, such as the fact that women in most countries lose their citizenship status when marrying a foreign citizen (Bredbenner 2018), the temporary travel ban on South-Asian husbands in Great Britain (Wray 2016), or the deportations of Mexican men in the United States, which Golash-Boza and Hondagneu (2013) call a “gendered racial removal program.” Thus, it is clear that both the ideal of free movement, as well as the restrictions to human mobility, are far from gender neutral (see also Shutes and Walker 2018).

#### *Transnational Intimacies and Hierarchies of Mobilities*

Mobility studies point out the sedentary bias that characterizes the ways in which migration and mobilities are dealt with in both policy and research, which Huysmans explores in his contribution to this issue. Instead of seeing mobility from the perspective of location, he calls for a focus on “flows in relation to one another rather than entities moving from one enclosed location to another” (Huysmans in this issue). These flows that are in relation to one another can be subject to capital-generating mechanisms, as Coward points out in his arguments on “deterritorial-

ized logistical life is constituted by infrastructures that enable digital circulation without movement of bodies” in this issue.

I would argue that transnational familiar intimacies and care can be conceptualized both as the “flows in relation to one another” that Huysmans (this issue) is stressing, as well as an example of the infrastructures that enable digital circulation without movement of bodies that Coward (this issue) points out. Scholarship on transnational families has explored the digital circulation of affection and care for a long time. “Skype mothers and Facebook daughters” (the illustrative title of a talk about ways in which care work and intimacy between transnational family members are shaped by the advancement in communication technologies; see [Baldassar and Merla 2013](#); [Francisco-Menchaves 2018](#)) were a reality for many long before COVID-related travel bans were put into place. Thus, I would argue that the digital circulation without movement of bodies that Coward (this issue) ascribes as a central element of the pandemic is a perspective that has actually been central to the studies of transnational family ties for a long time. This circulation is not only one of affection distributed through video calls or voice messages in cases of family separation, but often also a circulation of monetary assets.

One central way of social reproduction across borders in transnational family settings is remittances sent to family members. Against initial estimates by the World Bank, remittances have actually declined much less due to the pandemic than was first expected, and actually grown for certain regions of the world ([World Bank 2021](#)). Looking at these transnational intimacies and remittances from an intersectional perspective, we find that, in particular, working-class families engaged the most in social reproduction through remittances and therefore are also more dependent on and/or affected by the digitalization of care.

For some, confinement to their homes as a form of deterritorialized logistical life (Coward in this issue) is feasible or even sought after. For others, being able to move and travel is not a private leisure they give up on, but essential for meeting psychological, relational as well as often even physical and material needs. When care arrangements rely on regular cross-border visits, travel regulations, expensive test certificates, and the unequal distribution of vaccines (see, for example, [Tatar et al. 2021](#)) endanger the often gendered care responsibilities of many transnational families. A focus on carcerality and space is entangled with politics and logics of hierarchies of mobility. Transnational care work, both paid and unpaid, has been at the heart of transnational family lives long before any COVID-related forms of carceral confinement were put into place. Transnational families have often been forced to create mechanisms to live and cope with the “deterritorialized logistical lives” that Coward (this issue) connects to the pandemic, but there are steep hierarchies in who and how spatial confinements and bordering processes affect.

My uncle died right at the start of the pandemic, and my parents were coming to the funeral to Finland during the spring of 2020 on the day that Finland closed its borders for international travelers. My (German) father had difficulties when leaving, being told that he would not be let into the country. When they explained that the reason for travel was to attend a funeral, the German airport officials asked for proof for this claim. An informal WhatsApp message sent by me to my parents was deemed as acceptable proof, such a stark contrast to the wealth of written and certified documents I know many other incoming migrants are required to produce—with or without a pandemic—in order to be allowed to enter the country.

Tighter mobility restrictions have determined new spatializing techniques that restrict, control, monitor, and govern movement in ways that have been causing family separation and the interruption of interfamilial care-relations. Visitations with elderly or hospitalized relatives have impacted even those families who normally live spatially close to each other and are able to maintain close care relations without state interference ([Hugelius et al. 2021](#)). Thus, while the confinement to homes has brought certain families closer to each other than they would wish for, espe-

cially during times of closing schools and daycare institutions, others, in particular inter-generational care relations, were physically interrupted.

In my case, the pandemic had the opposite effect: instead of interrupting transnational and transgenerational care relations, restrictions enabled them. While my parents were able to enter the country for my uncle's funeral, flight cancellations hindered their return to Germany. Thus, suddenly I was enjoying the luxury of having my parents around to help home-schooling the kids while schools and daycare were closed, which normally we would have had to manage without any help from immediate family. Thus, while COVID restrictions separated so many families worldwide, it in our case enabled longer periods of joint family life and cross-generational care logistics.

Family separation as a serious state interruption of the most essential intimate ties is not limited to the pandemic, but rather a continuous outcome of bordering mechanisms. Transnational families separated by bordering regimes and tightening immigration regulations, families separated by conflict, war, and the resulting forced mobilities, or families where a family member is in detention, facing deportation, or already deported: for some, having state control mechanisms intrude your care-relations and intimate relations and dictating the amount of time that you can spend with the people you are the closest to is the norm (Pellander and Horsti 2018, Leinonen and Pellander 2020; Lopez 2019; Coddington and Williams 2022).

During the pandemic, a campaign with the hashtag #LoveIsNotTourism tried to advocate for travel rights for cross-border couples. The campaign included prominently numerous couples who, under non-pandemic circumstances, would be able to visit each other rather freely on tourist or other visas. With travel restrictions in place even for people who would normally be able to live a jet-setting lifestyle in transnational relationships, they were put under the (temporary) emotional strain that most transnational families who happen to be from parts of the world whose travel and immigration are regulated more heavily experience on a regular basis. Yet, it is to be expected that this will not lead to a large wave of solidarity and campaigning for free movement or the abolishment of restrictions. Rather, those who are privileged enough to just board a plane to visit their family will continue to be able to do so, while other people's mobilities will continue to be policed, bordered, securitized, monetarized, and restricted (see Rajaram as well as Altan-Olcay and Balta in this issue). Their hashtag campaigns and the border struggles of so many other families are part of the same continuum of regulating cross-border mobilities of people, but operate on very different levels.

I have shown the various ways in which transnational intimacies and transnational care work are examples of "flows in relation to one another," a perspective that Huysmans pointed toward in this issue. While care relations can and do go beyond the spatial confinements, they are nevertheless heavily and unequally influenced by policies of spatial confinement.

#### *Carceral Confinement and the Effects On Women*

Agamben's argument about the abolition of public space and contemplations over the stay-at-home orders and travel bans that many discussions in this issue are interesting when re-visited through a gendered lens, in particular when looking at the effects these have on women. Fighting the ways in which women have been confined more strongly to the home and private sphere and their movements and whereabouts controlled more strongly than men has been a central argument of the feminist movement from Simone de Beauvoir to Kate Millet. While I above argued that the "new" digital ways of connecting in times of physical separation are not new in transnational family settings, it can equally be argued that a confinement to their homes has pushed many women further "back" into the private sphere of the family, which the first and second wave feminist movements have fought their ways out of.

We find the devastating effects of stay-at-home orders on women to whom their homes can become one of the most dangerous places due to being subject to abusive relationships and, at worst, gendered violence. We know that the pandemic has increased the number of violent attacks against women<sup>3</sup> (see, for example, [Sanchez et al. 2020](#)). Migrant women are exposed to these risks at an even greater extent ([Mittal and Singh 2020](#)).

Furthermore, even though most workers were urged to work remotely, frontline healthcare workers were at the highest risk of infection (see also Rajaramin, this issue). Most healthcare workers are women, and women also form the majority of other professions for whom remote work was not an option, as this affected in particular jobs in lower-paid professions ([WHO 2019](#)). As an outcome of neoliberal economic restructuring and related migration policies, we see that this “international division of reproductive labor” ([Parreñas 2001](#), 61) affects migrant women in particular. Thus, the risk of infection was particularly high for females in care and service jobs. Overall, research findings that have analyzed mobile phone data suggest that lockdowns affected the mobility of women more than that of men ([Giscard 2020](#); [Caselli et al. 2021](#)).

In addition to these gendered effects of diffused carcerality, research suggests that women have also been hit harder by the economic effects of the pandemic. Especially the female-dominated service sector has seen the largest negative effects of lockdowns and other measures ([Profeta 2021](#); [Stevenson 2021](#)). In addition to precarious job situations, parents were facing an increase in child-caring responsibilities when schools and child-care facilities were closed—a responsibility taken on disproportionately by women ([Reichelt et al. 2021](#)).

When pointing out that confining people to their homes or restriction of (transnational) travel has had extremely devastating effects for many, this does not mean that I advocate for a world in which a virus can continue freely spreading and killing without political and medical attempts to protect public health.

Any restrictions of movements and travel need to take the intersectional hierarchies of movement and their effects into consideration. Diffused carcerality does not only mean that the carceral exists outside of the prison sphere, but carcerality, just as mobility, is “profoundly relational and experiential” ([Adey 2006](#), 83; cited in [Moran et al. 2018](#)). Forcing people to attend a conference online instead of traveling there in person or asking people to cancel holiday plans for recreational purposes is quite different from separating children from their parents, elderly from their closest caregivers, or confining victims of violence to their homes with their perpetrators. We have seen that exceptions to travel restrictions were possible in the case of, for example, seasonal workers. While transnational families might not be seen as essential to a national economy as berry-pickers, policies that restrict movements need to be crafted in a way that does not exacerbate existing hierarchies of (im)mobilities.

### Carceral Technique 6. Borders

*Jef Huysmans: Thinking Transversally With “COVID-19 Pandemic”*

“COVID-19 pandemic” is an event, not in the sense of an era-defining exceptional moment but in the sense of a fragment that takes the form of a sign that forces thought to think rather than reproduce given forms.<sup>4</sup> To think here means to create concepts that generate disjunctions by folding sense and non-sense, familiar and

<sup>3</sup>While I am writing about “women,” reflecting the research undertaken on the subject, I am aware of the binary understanding of gender that this perpetuates. While also realizing that not all those who are registered as “females” necessarily represent cis-women, I am furthermore aware that “women” are not a unified category of people, but encompass people who are positioned very differently when looked at through an intersectional perspective of race, class, location, sexuality, able-bodiedness, and other markers of difference.

unfamiliar (Zourabichvili 2012; Connolly 2011, 4). In this short piece, I take the “COVID-19 pandemic” as an event that invites transversal thought in relation to familiar repertoires that conceptualize movement as border crossing and externalize dangers. Transversal thought has two main characteristics. Connections gain their sense from the immanently differential relations between fragments without reference to a totality that they generate or from which they derive their significance. It refuses to derive the significance and sense of heterogeneous fragments from a homogenous whole (Bryx and Genosko 2010). Transversality also refers to modes of conceptualizing relations that move away from grounding the social and political in the drawing of lines between insides and outsides. Lines become lines of movements moving in relation to one another and folding creating densities, shocks, and so on rather than as lines of separation that need to be crossed. Transversality is then not simply about transgressing borders and boundaries but about questioning the spatial and conceptual logic, which makes borders and boundaries constitutive of political and social practice (Bleiker 2000, 2). I use the concepts of life-in-motion and life-as-folding to simultaneously express and do the transversalizing work of “COVID-19 pandemic.” They invite us to explore modes of analysis that both re-think and think beyond carcerality and its focus on practices of containing, control, and subordination or exclusion.

Let’s start from two observations. The “COVID-19 pandemic” is all about life being in motion. Viruses move, people move, things move, data move; everything moves, and relations exist because of movement and the relation between movements. It is an event that expresses that we live not as and within units but as and through movement. Secondly, it invites thinking the relations between human and non-human life, including microbial life, as foldings rather than a question of bodies invading other bodies. Microbes flow through the air but are already folded into human and animal life. Human bodies are not simply already containing microbial life but are partly only existing through them and vice versa. That does, of course, not mean that this is a harmonious or functional relation, as “COVID-19 pandemic” expresses clearly. The issue is more that humans, animals, plants, and microbes exist in immanent relations, which invites thinking relations differently from inter-action between two externally given units.

But! Hang on a second. Is this really what “COVID-19 pandemic” shows us? Does it not really reinforce thinking exactly the opposite? In the governance of COVID and the analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic, a lot of attention has been given to familiar repertoires that privilege sedentary conceptions of life and separations between human life and microbial life. As Altan-Olcay and Balta and Van Houtum and Van Uden in this issue most explicitly express, quite an awful lot of bordering has been going on, reinforcing that life exists primarily not through movement but in territorially contained settlements ranging from the home, over the neighborhood to the state, and the globe (Aradau and Tazzioli 2021; Bigo et al. 2021; Radil et al. 2021). Is locking movement into ever smaller containers—from a region over the state to a hotel room—not what has characterized the governance of pathogens through lockdown? “COVID-19 pandemic” thus appears to be much more about limiting movement by territorially enclosing it than inviting us to see life as essentially being in motion.

The focus on borders and bordering presumes that human life is primarily sedentary. This view is intensely inscribed in a range of conceptions of human history, including our valuing of home, the understanding of the international as a system of territorial sovereign states, histories of civilization that reiterate how hunter-gatherers settling in agricultural communities is a defining moment in human his-

<sup>4</sup>For an excellent discussion of different ways in which the concept of “event” has been used in analyses of COVID-19, see Repo and Richter (2022) “An eventual pandemic: thinking the COVID-19 ‘event’ with Deleuze and Foucault.” *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory*. DOI: 10.1080/1600910X.2022.2086595 (online first). My use of the term is in line with what Repo and Richter refer to as “evental” to differentiate it from other conceptualizations of events.

tory, and so on (Scott 2017). These points of view do, of course, include movements of people, goods, capital, and so on. However, movement is understood within a sedentary conception of life as movement across borders and from one settler unit to another. Movement depends on already drawn lines that separate a sedentary entity (home, neighborhood, region, state, . . .) from its environment creating insides and outsides. Location is thus primary. Movement is the secondary phenomenon of crossing the lines that separate locations and constitute them as social and political entities.

Yet, “COVID-19 pandemic” has also made it intensely clear that sedentary life is never sedentary and that borders never contain but rather try to organize movement. People, goods, capital, and services continue to move and need to continue moving or the living stop living. Viruses also continue to move. They perform bordering practices—e.g., creating spaces of viral risk—but they do this through their movement and their continuing moving across borders that seek to contain them (du Plessis 2018). Despite the continuing sedentary hold on movement in the governance of COVID-19, “COVID-19 pandemic” is an event that also invites conceptualizing a primacy of movement that let’s life emerge in the relation between the multiple movements of microbes, humans, goods, and capital. Such a conception takes movements as flows in relation to one another rather than entities moving from one enclosed location to another or, as in Coward’s contribution (this issue), from one node to the next in a logistical network (Huysmans 2021). It is a transversal conception of movement that shifts from lines of separating and circumscribing to movement as lines along and through which life is lived (Ingold 2011, 145–55). Relations exist as the swerving of movements that bring movements in contact with one another. The primary force is then not crossing lines but moving in relation to other movements—movements-moving (Manning 2016). It is a mode of thought that invites thinking “COVID-19 pandemic” from the point of view of the continuous movements of microbes, humans, goods, and services, the temporary attuning, knotting, and tensing between these movements, and the emergence of bodies and things through these movements. It implies a distinctive point of view on spatial arranging in which space is not a surface upon which one draws enclosures but the densities and intensities that are created by the lines of movement moving across and in tension. Think of knots of lines (Ingold 2011, 145–155), the spatiality of which comes into being through the knotting rather than by drawing lines on a given surface. Such a point of view allows to read borders not as lines of separation but as zones that only come into being through the densities and intensities of a multiplicity of movements (Ozguç 2021). Borders are not the organizing device but an effect of a continuity of movements swerving in relation to one another. In terms of governance practices, the concept of movements-moving creates a sensitivity toward modes of governing that work protection not in a carceral world of containers but from within a world of entangling lines of moving viruses, cells, bodies, and products, for example, by inserting a vaccine in the mix that changes the movements of viruses, cells, and bodies in relation to one another.

What about the second observation—“COVID-19 pandemic” inviting us to conceptualize the relation between microbial life and human life in terms of foldings rather than invasion. One can ask again whether this is indeed what “COVID-19 pandemic” brings to the table. Does “COVID-19 pandemic” not really invite a stark separation between microbial life and human life, or more generally non-human life and human life? We have witnessed and lived an intensive securitization of microbial life in a war on pathogens—a war on the virus and its mutations (Fishel et al. 2021). Securitization significantly reduces the complexity of the relation between human life and microbial life by externalizing microbial life as things that dangerously permeate human bodies and societies from the outside. Similar externalizing renditions of pathogenic dangers can be observed in account the see “COVID-19 pandemic” as a result of environmental destructions bringing dangerous microbial

life in contact with humans because animal carriers are moving closer to human habitations. Rather than thinking the relation as one of folding of microbial, animal, and human movements, movement is understood to be invasive. So, we are back to movement being about entities changing containers, from outside bodies or human habitats to inside them.

But are we? Does the “COVID-19 pandemic” not also draw our attention to how lives of pathogens, animals, and humans are, and have been, closely intertwined? The notion of “pandemics” has drawn attention to the relevance of microbial life and their presence in economic, natural, societal, and political life in international studies (Voelkner 2011; Elbe 2014; du Plessis 2018; Voelkner and du Plessis 2021). It suggests a much more complex relation between microbial life, including pathogens, and human life than simply inimical interaction between external entities. It looks much more like the relation is one of multiple foldings in which economic actors, political actors, and microbial actors exist and emerge in a much more intimate relation than suggested by the conception of a war on pathogens. Their relation is one in which organisms bend the environment around themselves. In doing so, they also bend their relation to other organisms upon which they depend. In the flows of matter and life, organisms thus continuously arrange themselves and their environment while also being continuously arranged by other organisms that are also bending their environment around themselves (Latour 2017, 101–104). So, it is in the folds created in-between bendings of both human and non-human organisms that life exists. Similar to movements-moving, life does not arise from organisms controlling their environment but from the way their own bending is always also already being bent by others. Force is in the tensions, densities, intensities, and dependencies between the bending taking place. Bodies then emerge not as enclosed entities that interact with an independently constituted or externalized environment; instead, they exist and emerge in and through moving in relation to other movements around them (Malaviya 2020, 90). Interaction between bodies and the external relation of human and nature give way to immanent dependencies (Latour 2017, 104) arising from co-existing in and through multiple movements moving. Life and bodies are then in continuous becoming.

Taking such “foldings” serious does not mean that relations cannot be dangerous for organic bodies, but it does make it problematic to enact an externalization of microbial life on the back of engaging pathogens. It inserts a sensitivity to explore how the government of pathogens in medical, economic, and other practices enact between them pathogens from the point of view of immanent and complex relations between microbes and humans. Thinking in terms of movements-moving and foldings opens different ways of approaching relations to pathogens. It includes working with an abundance of life rather than rarifying life that needs to be eliminated or incarcerated, to speak with du Plessis (2018, 401). It also repositions the conception of “humanity.” The other contributions work largely with an enclosed concept of humanity, focusing on effects of the pandemic on human activity and stratifications and discriminations within humanity. Thinking about life as existing in and through foldings of human and non-human life, organic and non-organic movements unbinds humanity in the sense that humanity cannot be taken as a world of its own. Humanity is essentially folded into geological and natural movements. Life-as-folding thus also invites rethinking the humanist conception of humanity, which explicitly informs the contributions of Altan-Olcay and Balta, Van Houtum and Van Uden, Pellander, and Rajaram in this issue, for example through what is currently referred to as planetary conceptions of life (Chakrabarty 2021).

The intention of this short section has been mainly to indicate how “COVID-19 pandemic” is an event that invites transversalizing thought. Despite the many bordering practices and iterations of modernist human/nature separation, “COVID-19 pandemic” remains an event that helps us ask how to conceptualize life as life-in-motion that is also life-as-folding. I do not mean here that the event invites a dif-



ferent perspective—a re-iteration of the classic distinction between territory and flows, sedentary and mobile, favoring the latter over the former. At issue is that by taking movement as primary, bordering and externalizations of nature emerge differently; the latter do exist within the point of view of life-in-motion, which is also life in folding, but differently. Analytically, they emerge transversally as fluid effects of movements-moving folding nature and humanity rather than as fixed configurations of separations of insides and outsides. That is what I mean by saying that “COVID-19 pandemic” creates disjunctions in thinking pandemics through familiar carceral repertoires that focus on sedentary conceptions of movement linked to bordering and securitizing rationales that reproduce an externalization of natural life from human life. As an event, it asks us to reconnect the familiar, less familiar, and unfamiliar, not aiming for a new synthesis or a juxtaposition but to let the contemporary emerge as becoming rather than either a reproducing or revolutionizing of the past.

In doing so, life-in-motion and life-as-folding critically engage with carceral readings of the COVID-19 pandemic in at least two ways. It invites revisiting how control is enacted transversally, not by containing and related boundary drawing techniques but within and through movements moving. Domenech and Tirado’s analysis of extititional techniques of governing movement in social care and criminal justice practices, among others, is a good example (Tirado and Domènech 2013). However, life-in-motion also pushes us to think beyond carceral points of view. The latter tend to center on the techniques and practices of control and the modes of domination, exclusion, and precarity it creates. It tends to freeze life into structural stratifications that are reproduced (see Rajaram, this issue). Life-in-motion as abundant and in continuous becoming is also full of chances and transmutations. As a point of view, life-in-motion thus demands that we move beyond critique and account for happenings like COVID-19 through the unsettling and creative engagements within carceral situations that create an irreducible heterogeneity and lines of flight—possibilities that we do not know how they will work out but that are there. For example, it would mean that we think COVID-19 with Pellander (this issue) through how care practices and situations and their experience transmute, or with Coward (this issue) through how changes in work and family practices reconfigure logistical lines along and through which lives are lived and in doing so disturb stratifications. Such a point of view allows for making sense of the creativity that is embedded in how organic and non-organic movements enact in-between them something like COVID-19.

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