Özener, Başak Altan2021-06-152021-06-152020-062073-4336http://hdl.handle.net/10679/7438https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020022We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessArticle11200062104210000610.3390/g11020022DifferentiationDurable goodsMonopolyPricingQuality2-s2.0-85085329863