Young, K. L.Yağcı, Alper H.2020-09-032020-09-032019-05-041356-3467http://hdl.handle.net/10679/6882https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1446923Within the literature on financial governance a key question is why the 2008 financial crisis did not elicit a stronger regulatory reaction than it did - the 'post-crisis stasis' puzzle. We explore a neglected dimension of this puzzle: public attitudes toward financial regulation. Using a variety of survey data of the US public we find that there was persistent support for stronger financial regulation following the crisis, even support for radical reform in some instances, and support continued even after regulatory reform had been enacted. Despite such general sentiment, however, at nearly every stage public attitudes were highly conditional on partisan affiliation - a hugely consequential detail that meant that demand for reform was not channelled into more stringent policy but rather into a highly partisan, status quo protecting political machinery. Our analysis challenges notions of US public attitudes as either conservative in orientation or placated through modest reform, but also highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping financial reform options despite majoritarian support for more robust reform.enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessArticle24331333300046189370000310.1080/13563467.2018.1446923FinanceRegulationPublic opinionAttitudesFinancial crisisAmerican politics2-s2.0-85044281487