Oktar, Sibel2016-02-232016-02-232011978-94-007-0624-8http://hdl.handle.net/10679/3971Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a non-natural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world sub specie aeterni, without a need for a supersensible reality.engrestrictedAccessbookPart108213225000298932500015