Özener, Başak Altan2019-03-292019-03-292018-120932-4569http://hdl.handle.net/10679/6244https://doi.org/10.1628/093245618X15160188867245This study analyzes a damaged-goods market for a perfectly durable good in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria of this game under different buyer upgrade possibilities as a function of the common discount factor, the length of the time period between successive price changes, and the quality levels of the goods. We establish that introducing a lower-quality good (or equivalently, damaging a good) works as a commitment device only if consumers holding a durable good cannot reenter the market. When a buyer can upgrade the product, we establish that for all parameter values the Coase conjecture survives.enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessArticle174474376500044759080000610.1628/093245618X15160188867245Durable goodsMonopolyDamaged goodsUpgradesPricing2-s2.0-85070688029