Akın, ÖzlemColeman, N. S.Fons‐Rosen, C.Peydró, J.-L.2020-10-232020-10-232021-090046-3892http://hdl.handle.net/10679/7046https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12292We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In politically connected banks, insider buying during the pre-TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank-specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance-related government connections. Through a Freedom of Information Act request, we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Article50361964400056636010000110.1111/fima.12292Bank bailoutsInsider tradingPolitical connectionsPolitical economy in bankingTARP2-s2.0-85090088657