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dc.contributor.authorCaskurlu, B.
dc.contributor.authorEkici, Özgün
dc.contributor.authorKizilkaya, F. E.
dc.contributor.editorChen, J.
dc.contributor.editorFeng, Q.
dc.contributor.editorXu, J.
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-20T13:17:03Z
dc.date.available2021-09-20T13:17:03Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.isbn978-303059266-0
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/7569
dc.identifier.urihttps://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-59267-7_23
dc.description.abstractIn a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication, coordination or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. We study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation TAMC 2020: Theory and Applications of Models of Computation
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleOn existence of equilibrium under social coalition structuresen_US
dc.typeConference paperen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0001-7053-4735 & YÖK ID 188443) Ekici, Özgün
dc.contributor.ozuauthorEkici, Özgün
dc.identifier.volume12337en_US
dc.identifier.startpage263en_US
dc.identifier.endpage274en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-59267-7_23en_US
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-85093848809
dc.contributor.authorMale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryConference Paper - International - Institutional Academic Staff


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