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dc.contributor.authorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-15T13:05:47Z
dc.date.available2021-06-15T13:05:47Z
dc.date.issued2020-06
dc.identifier.issn2073-4336en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/7438
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/2/22
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMDPIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofGames
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.titleDynamic durable goods monopoly and market poweren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionPublisher versionen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0002-8960-5879 & YÖK ID 150968) Altan, Başak
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.identifier.volume11en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/g11020022en_US
dc.relation.ecinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/12345.
dc.subject.keywordsDifferentiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsDurable goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsMonopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsPricingen_US
dc.subject.keywordsQualityen_US
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-85085329863
dc.contributor.authorFemale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryArticle - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff


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