Browsing Economics by Author "Kizilkaya, F. E."
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On approximate Nash equilibria of the two-source connection game
Çaşkurlu, B.; Açikalin, U. U.; Kizilkaya, F. E.; Ekici, Özgün (TÜBİTAK, 2022)The arbitrary-sharing connection game is prominent in the network formation game literature [1]. An undirected graph with positive edge weights is given, where the weight of an edge is the cost of building it. An edge is ... -
On efficient computation of equilibrium under social coalition structures
In game-theoretic settings the key notion of analysis is an equilibrium, which is a profile of agent strategies such that no viable coalition of agents can improve upon their coalitional welfare by jointly changing their ... -
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Caskurlu, B.; Ekici, Özgün; Kizilkaya, F. E. (Cambridge University Press, 2022-02)In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can ... -
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Caskurlu, B.; Ekici, Özgün; Kizilkaya, F. E. (Springer, 2020)In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined ...
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