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Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks

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dc.contributor.authorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.contributor.departmentEconomics
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖZENER, Başak Altan
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-30T08:32:43Z
dc.date.available2020-06-30T08:32:43Z
dc.date.issued2019-10
dc.description.abstractWe study a sequential agency problem with hidden actions in an infinite horizon dynamic setting. The principal has a project that requires completion of two sequential tasks where the predecessor must be finished before the successor can be started. We characterize the efficient outcome as well as the optimal full commitment contract.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85070390506
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/6666
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606
dc.identifier.volume183en_US
dc.identifier.wos000487573400028
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Letters
dc.relation.publicationcategoryInternational Refereed Journal
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.subject.keywordsMoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordsSequential tasksen_US
dc.subject.keywordsOptimal contracten_US
dc.titleDynamic moral hazard with sequential tasksen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication2afe80e3-623c-4807-a57e-2ce75845ccea
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery2afe80e3-623c-4807-a57e-2ce75845ccea

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