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GÜNEY, Begüm

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Begüm

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Now showing 1 - 7 of 7
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    ArticlePublicationOpen Access
    Domine edilen statükonun referans etkisi
    (Okan Üniversitesi, 2018-05) Güney, Begüm; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    Statüko, bir kişinin şu anki konumunu temsil eder. Çalışılan iş ve yaşanılan şehir statüko için verilebilecek örnekler arasındadır. Bir statüko, kendi seçilmese bile, diğer alternatifler arasındaki göreceli sıralamayı değiştirerek kişinin bu alternatifler arasındaki seçimini etkileyebilir ve buna “referans etkisi” denir. Bu çalışmada, statükoların referans etkisini anlamak için Özyeğin Üniversitesi lisans öğrencileri arasında bir anket yapılmıştır. Anket, Qualtrics programı kullanılarak hazırlanmış ve katılımcıların e-posta adreslerine tek kullanımlık bir bağlantı gönderilerek öğrencilerle paylaşılmıştır. Ankette katılımcılardan, depolama kapasitesi ve pil ömrü ile tanımlanmış farklı telefonlar arasında seçim yapmaları istenmiştir. Görülmüştür ki, statüko diğer alternatiflerin her biri tarafından domine edildiğinde - yani diğer alternatiflerden hem pil ömrü hem depolama kapasitesi bakımından daha kötü olduğunda - ve kendi seçilmediğinde bile, kişinin bu alternatifler arasındaki seçimini değiştirebilir. İstatistiki olarak anlamlı miktarda kişinin, aynı kümeden statüko varlığında ve yokluğunda yaptığı seçimlerin farklı olduğu görülmüştür. Bu davranış, literatürdeki teorik statüko modelleri arasından ancak sürekli referans etkisine izin verenler (Guney ve Richter, 2017) tarafından açıklanabilmektedir.
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    Costly switching from a status quo
    (Elsevier, 2018-12) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    We axiomatically characterize a theory of status quo-dependent choice where an agent faces switching costs that depend upon both the status quo and the alternative he switches to. In a choice problem with a status quo, the agent chooses the alternatives that yield the highest utility net of switching cost. This generates status quo bias and also allows for a wide range of reference effects. We examine the behavior of such agents in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games. In a single PD game, switching costs can lead to cooperation. However, across different PD games, it is not “anything goes” and instead we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation rates to be consistent with our model. We then verify that these conditions are satisfied by Charness et al.’s (2016) experimental data. We also perform a similar analysis for other theories such as models of status quo bias, magical thinking, inequity aversion, and fairness; and find that these theories make either invalidated or looser predictions.
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    An experiment on aspiration-based choice
    (Elsevier, 2015-11) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    This paper experimentally studies the influence of aspirations on choice. Motivated by the theoretical model of Guney et al. (2015), we consider choice problems which may include unavailable alternatives. In a choice problem, an aspiration is the most desired alternative there (available or not). In our design, we endogenously derive both aspirations and a subjective similarity notion that operates between an aspiration and other alternatives. We find that (i) choice reversals are more likely when an unavailable aspiration alternative is added into the environment than when an unavailable non-aspiration alternative is added, (ii) an available option is more likely to be chosen when there is an unavailable aspiration that is similar to it compared to when there is no such option in the environment, (iii) choices are better explained by a similarity-based procedure when the subjective similarity notion that is derived in a separate part of the experiment is used rather than the Euclidean distance.
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    Aspiration-based choice
    (Elsevier, 2018-07) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Tsur, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    Numerous studies and experiments suggest that aspirations for desired but perhaps unavailable alternatives influence decisions. A common finding is that an unavailable aspiration steers agents to choose similar available alternatives. We propose and axiomatically characterize a choice theory consistent with this aspirational effect. Similarity is modeled using a subjective metric derived from choice data. This model offers implications for consumer welfare and its distribution between rich and poor when firms compete for aspirational agents, and a novel rationale for sales.
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    Independent vs. coordinated fundraising: Understanding the role of information
    (Elsevier, 2020-08) Eckel, C.; Güney, Begüm; Uler, N.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    We use "real donation" laboratory experiments to compare independent fundraising, where donation requests from different charities arrive sequentially to potential donors, with coordinated fundraising, where donation requests from different charities arrive simultaneously. We find that coordinated fundraising generates significantly larger total donations compared to independent fundraising. We show that the order of requests affects the level of donations only in independent fundraising; in particular, participants donate larger amounts to charities whose requests arrive earlier. We then test whether these differences might be explained by the informational asymmetry between these two fundraising mechanisms by varying the information received by the subjects.
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    ArticlePublicationOpen Access
    Games with switching costs and endogenous references
    (Wiley, 2022-05-25) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one-player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε-equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.
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    A theory of iterative choice in lists
    (Elsevier, 2014-08) Güney, Begüm; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    In a list, alternatives appear according to an order and the decision maker follows this order to evaluate alternatives. He records the first alternative as the initial survivor and then at every stage, he compares the current survivor with the next alternative in the list to determine whether the next alternative replaces that to become the new survivor. When the entire list is exhausted in this manner, the agent chooses the survivor in the last stage. We call this procedure “iterative” and provide an axiomatic characterization for it when the order in every list is observable. Then, we also study characterizations of the iterative procedure that is prone to the well-known primacy and recency effects. Finally, we analyze situations where the order of alternatives is unknown to an outside observer and provide a characterization result that enables such an outsider with limited information to understand whether the decision maker can indeed be an iterative list chooser for some order.