Person: ÖZENER, Başak Altan
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Başak Altan
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ÖZENER
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ArticlePublication Open Access Price and quality decisions of a service provider under heterogeneous demand(Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2019) Özener, Başak Altan; Atahan, Pelin; Economics; Sectoral Education and Professional Development; ÖZENER, Başak Altan; DEMİRCİLER, Pelin AtahanA monopolist service provider's quality and price decisions are analyzed in a vertically differentiated market where customers demand different quantities of a service. We find that depending on the relative sizes of the market segments and the difference in the valuations of different customers, the service provider may find it optimal to either offer a non-discriminating service or a discriminating service serving only high-valuation customers. The service provider never finds it optimal to serve the market segments that have low-valuation for quality when the discrimination strategy is optimal. © 2019 Bogazici Universitesi. All rights reserved.
ArticlePublication Metadata only A game theoretical approach for improving the operational efficiencies of less-than-truckload carriers through load exchanges(Springer, 2021-09) Özener, Başak Altan; Özener, Okan Örsan; Economics; Industrial Engineering; ÖZENER, Başak Altan; ÖZENER, Okan ÖrsanLess-than-truckload (LTL) transportation offers fast, flexible and relatively low-cost transportation services to shippers. In order to cope with the effects of economic recessions, the LTL industry implemented ideas such as reducing excess capacity and increasing revenues through better yield management. In this paper, we extend these initiatives beyond the reach of individual carriers and propose a collaborative framework that facilitates load exchanges to reduce the operational costs. Even though collective solutions are proven to provide benefits to the participants by reducing the inefficiencies using a system-wide perspective, such solutions are often not attainable in real-life as the negotiating parties are seeking to maximize their individual profits rather than the overall profit and also they are unwilling to share confidential information. Therefore, a mechanism that enables collaboration among the carriers should account for the rationality of the individual participants and should require minimal information transfer between participants. Having this in mind, we propose a mechanism that facilities collaboration through a series of load exchange iterations and identifies an equilibrium among selfish carriers with limited information transfer among the participants. Our time-efficient mechanism can handle large instances with thousands of loads as well as provide significant benefits over the non-collaborative management of LTL networks.ArticlePublication Metadata only Pricing decisions in a strategic single retailer/dual suppliers setting under order size constraints(Informa Group, 2016) Ekici, Ali; Özener, Başak Altan; Özener, Okan Örsan; Economics; Industrial Engineering; EKİCİ, Ali; ÖZENER, Başak Altan; ÖZENER, Okan ÖrsanIn this paper, we study a duopolistic market of suppliers competing for the business of a retailer. The retailer sets the order cycle and quantities from each supplier to minimize its annual costs. Different from other studies in the literature, our work simultaneously considers the order size restriction and the benefit of order consolidation, and shows non-trivial pricing behaviour of the suppliers under different settings. Under asymmetric information setting, we formulate the pricing problem of the preferred supplier as a non-linear programming problem and use Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions to find the optimal solution. In general, unless the preferred supplier has high-order size limit, it prefers sharing the market with its competitor when retailer’s demand, benefit of order consolidation or fixed cost of ordering from the preferred supplier is high. We model the symmetric information setting as a two-agent non-zero sum pricing game and establish the equilibrium conditions. We show that a supplier might set a ‘threshold price’ to capture the entire market if its per unit fixed ordering cost is sufficiently small. Finally, we prove that there exists a joint-order Nash equilibrium only if the suppliers set identical prices low enough to make the retailer place full-size orders from both.ArticlePublication Open Access Dynamic durable goods monopoly and market power(MDPI, 2020-06) Özener, Başak Altan; Economics; ÖZENER, Başak AltanWe analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.ArticlePublication Metadata only Cost allocation mechanisms in a peer‐to‐peer network(Wiley, 2019-01) Özener, Başak Altan; Özener, Okan Örsan; Economics; Industrial Engineering; ÖZENER, Başak Altan; ÖZENER, Okan ÖrsanThis study analyzes a cooperative game between a service provider and a set of users. We consider a P2P network where the service provider broadcasts the content across the network and the users collaborate to seed the content to a subset of users in the network. The objective of the service provider is to determine the minimum cost network solution and to allocate this joint-cost fairly among the users. The minimum cost network solution can be determined by solving a minimum cost Steiner tree problem. We propose four cost allocation mechanisms: a dual linear programming based mechanism, an approximation mechanism to the Shapley value, a partition-based mechanism, and an approximation mechanism to the nucleolus. We conduct an extensive computational study to assess the performance of the proposed mechanisms on randomly generated instances. We conclude that our partition-based mechanism and the nucleolus-approximation outperform the other allocation mechanisms, including the benchmark mechanism.ArticlePublication Metadata only Production planning with flexible manufacturing systems under demand uncertainty(Taylor & Francis, 2024) Elyasi, M.; Özener, Başak Altan; Ekici, Ali; Özener, Okan Örsan; Economics; Industrial Engineering; ÖZENER, Başak Altan; EKİCİ, Ali; ÖZENER, Okan ÖrsanThis paper delves into the impacts of an ongoing global crisis on the resilience of supply chains. Furthermore, it proposes measures to address and mitigate the disruptions caused by the prevailing uncertainties. For example, while the economy has started to recover after the pandemic and demand has increased, companies have not fully returned to their pre-pandemic levels. To enhance their supply chain resilience and effectively manage disruptions, one viable strategy is the implementation of flexible/hybrid manufacturing systems. This research is motivated by the specific requirements of Vestel Electronics, a household appliances company, which seeks a flexible/hybrid manufacturing production setup involving dedicated machinery to meet regular demand and the utilisation of flexible manufacturing system (FMS) to handle surges in demand. We employ a scenario-based approach to model demand uncertainty, enabling the company to make immediate and adaptive decisions that take advantage of the cost-effectiveness of standard production and the responsiveness of FMS. To solve the problem, we propose a heuristic algorithm based on column generation. The numerical results demonstrate that our optimisation model provides solutions with an average optimality gap of less than 6% while also reducing the average cost of standard production schemes without FMS by over 12%.ArticlePublication Open Access Client-server versus peer-to-peer(Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, 2016) Özener, Başak Altan; Sunay, Mehmet Oğuz; Economics; Computer Science; ÖZENER, Başak Altan; SUNAY, Mehmet OğuzThis study identifies optimal transmission mechanisms for a video streaming service in a peer-to-peer network structure under different payment mechanisms: pay as you watch and pay upfront. We calculate a uniform, feasible service price using the utilities of the users and associated server profits for every possible peer-to-peer distribution tree. We prove that when the server has linear or concave costs, the client-server structure is more profitable than any peer-to-peer structure. This statement holds even when the users have maximal tolerance to indefinitely long pre-roll delays. When the server however, has convex costs, we show that the optimal network structure depends on the system parameters and there is no single distribution mechanism that provides the optimal server profit for every operating point of the network.ArticlePublication Metadata only Damaged durable goods, upgrades, and the coase conjecture(Mohr Siebeck, 2018-12) Özener, Başak Altan; Economics; ÖZENER, Başak AltanThis study analyzes a damaged-goods market for a perfectly durable good in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria of this game under different buyer upgrade possibilities as a function of the common discount factor, the length of the time period between successive price changes, and the quality levels of the goods. We establish that introducing a lower-quality good (or equivalently, damaging a good) works as a commitment device only if consumers holding a durable good cannot reenter the market. When a buyer can upgrade the product, we establish that for all parameter values the Coase conjecture survives.ArticlePublication Metadata only Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks(Elsevier, 2019-10) Özener, Başak Altan; Economics; ÖZENER, Başak AltanWe study a sequential agency problem with hidden actions in an infinite horizon dynamic setting. The principal has a project that requires completion of two sequential tasks where the predecessor must be finished before the successor can be started. We characterize the efficient outcome as well as the optimal full commitment contract.ArticlePublication Metadata only Optimal peer-to-peer network for streaming multimedia broadcast(Elsevier, 2020-11) Özener, Başak Altan; Sunay, M. O.; Economics; ÖZENER, Başak AltanThis study identifies optimal transmission mechanisms for a streaming video service in a peer-to-peer network structure as a function of the number of active peers, a common service value, a common discount factor, and costs accumulated by the server and peers under two different peer participation settings: no peer churn and with peer churn. We calculate a uniform service price for every possible peer-to-peer distribution tree and identify the optimal transmission mechanism under different cost structures.