Person:
THOMAS, Sibel Oktar

Profile Picture

Email Address

Birth Date

WoSGoogle ScholarORCID

Name

Job Title

First Name

Sibel Oktar

Last Name

THOMAS
OrgUnit Logo
Organizational Unit

Filters

20111
Reset filters

Settings

Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
  • Placeholder
    Book PartPublicationMetadata only
    Transcendental ethics
    (Springer, 2011) Oktar, Sibel; Humanities and Social Sciences; THOMAS, Sibel Oktar
    Our ontological, epistemological and metaphysical point of view is a very important determinant of how we conceive ethics and the possibility of ethical discourse. Kant, G.E. Moore and Wittgenstein had a quite eloquent discourse on ethics though they were, prima facie, incompatible. Kant regards ethics as belonging to supersensible reality, Moore, tells us that “goodness” is a non-natural and intuitively known notion. Wittgenstein says he “respected deeply” that that he himself could not talk about. Both Kant and Wittgenstein might at least find a common point on the idea of ethics being transcendental, whereas Moore strongly objects. I will try to show that Moore’s notion of “good” as a non-natural object that does not exist in time is difficult to conceive without assuming a “transcendental object” and the existence of a supersensible reality, as Kant does. I will investigate the role of transcending the limits of language in Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics where it manifests itself in our attitude towards the world. I will argue that Wittgenstein suggests a transcendental ethics with an account of viewing the world sub specie aeterni, without a need for a supersensible reality.