Browsing by Author "Caskurlu, B."
Now showing items 1-4 of 4
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On efficient computation of equilibrium under social coalition structures
In game-theoretic settings the key notion of analysis is an equilibrium, which is a profile of agent strategies such that no viable coalition of agents can improve upon their coalitional welfare by jointly changing their ... -
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Caskurlu, B.; Ekici, Özgün; Kizilkaya, F. E. (Cambridge University Press, 2022-02)In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can ... -
On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Caskurlu, B.; Ekici, Özgün; Kizilkaya, F. E. (Springer, 2020)In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined ... -
On singleton congestion games with resilience against collusion
Caskurlu, B.; Ekici, Özgün; Kızılkaya, F. E. (Springer, 2021)We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving ...
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