Economics

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    Games with switching costs and endogenous references
    (Wiley, 2022-05-25) Güney, Begüm; Richter, M.; Economics; GÜNEY, Begüm
    We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one-player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are sets of SNE, which can never be a set of Nash equilibrium for any standard game; and (iii) SNE with a specific cost structure exactly characterizes the Nash equilibrium of nearby games, in contrast to Radner's (1980) ε-equilibrium. Subsequently, we apply our SNE notion to a product differentiation model, and reach the opposite conclusion of Radner (1980): switching costs for firms may benefit consumers. Finally, we compare our model with others, especially Köszegi and Rabin's (2006) personal equilibrium.