Browsing by Author "Ozdemir, Z. D."
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ArticlePublication Metadata only Drug prescription behavior and decision support systems(Elsevier, 2014-01) Akçura, Munir Tolga; Ozdemir, Z. D.; Business Administration; AKÇURA, Münir TolgaAdverse drug events plague the outcomes of health care services. In this research, we propose a clinical learning model that incorporates the use of a decision support system (DSS) in drug prescriptions to improve physicians' decisions about the initial drug selection and administration. The model allows for both the analytical investigation of the effects of different DSS features on clinical learning and the estimation of the physician learning behavior given a panel data set. The analytical results suggest that using a DSS to improve physicians' prescription decisions would positively influence their clinical learning. Conversely, without improvements in successful drug selection, the use of a DSS would negatively affect clinical learning. The empirical results provide further evidence on the factors that drive physicians' responses to information sources and the extent to which they rely on clinical experience in prescribing drugs.ArticlePublication Metadata only Expert competition and the internet(IJEC, 2013) Akçura, Munir Tolga; Ozdemir, Z. D.; Jain, S.; Business Administration; AKÇURA, Münir TolgaThe Internet has become a channel for experts offering their services. We investigate the optimal online channel adoption strategy of a high-quality expert with a brick-and-mortar presence in the face of potential entry by an expert with just an online presence. We find that the high-quality expert does not have the incentive to adopt the online channel unless new entry is imminent. If the incumbent high-quality expert cannot offer a sufficiently high-quality online service, the incumbent expert accommodates entry and provides only a face-to-face service. However, a satisfactory level of online quality allows the incumbent expert to deter entry and to limit what would otherwise be a more intense competition. This paper thus establishes an entry deterrence role for the adoption of the online channel in expert markets. In addition, the results partially explain the reasons behind the quick adoption of the online channel in tax preparation services and physicians’ reluctance to offer online consultations.ArticlePublication Metadata only Online intermediary as a channel for selling quality-differentiated services(Wiley, 2015-02) Akçura, Munir Tolga; Ozdemir, Z. D.; Rahman, M. S.; Business Administration; AKÇURA, Münir TolgaWhen deciding whether to utilize an online intermediary in addition to their own distribution channels, quality differentiated service providers face the trade-off between the benefit of extended reach and the threat of increased competition. Using an analytical framework, we analyze when and how service providers may utilize an online intermediary to their advantage in the presence of advance selling (i.e., selling a service at an early date for future consumption). In general, when an online intermediary is used, the competition effect dominates the reach effect and leads to a falling price trend. Interestingly, we find that the negative effect of increased competition on profits, due to intermediary usage, can be reversed by committing to self-imposed participation limits (i.e., selling only a predetermined amount of services through the online intermediary). This ensures that the service provider is better off selling through both its own site and the online intermediary, rather than selling exclusively using either channel.ArticlePublication Metadata only A strategic analysis of multi-channel expert services(Informa, 2017) Akçura, Munir Tolga; Ozdemir, Z. D.; Business Administration; AKÇURA, Münir TolgaUsing stylized models, we investigate when and how expert service providers should offer their services online, and whether they should charge separate prices for face-to-face and online services or provide the online service as a free supplement. Interestingly, consumer surplus can rise when a monopolist charges different prices for face-to-face and online services, and it may drop when the monopolist starts offering the online service as a free add-on to its face-to-face service. We find that a market-wide adoption of the online channel by competing experts in a duopoly setting intensifies price competition and thereby reduces overall profits. Furthermore, the rate of adoption is highest when the online service is moderately effective, whereas one of the experts refuses to offer the service when it is highly effective. These results provide theoretical support for the viability of online expert services as well as practical guidance on pricing strategies.