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dc.contributor.authorEkici, Özgün
dc.contributor.authorKesten, O.
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-26T11:49:00Z
dc.date.available2015-10-26T11:49:00Z
dc.date.issued2016-08
dc.identifier.issn1432-1270
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/967
dc.identifier.urihttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00182-015-0475-9
dc.descriptionDue to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
dc.description.abstractThe prominent mechanism of the recent literature in the assignment problem is the probabilistic serial (PS). Under PS, the truthful (preference) proÖle always constitutes an ordinal Nash Equilibrium, inducing a random assignment that satisÖes the appealing ordinal e¢ ciency and envy-freeness properties. We show that both properties may fail to be satisÖed by a random assignment induced in an ordinal Nash Equilibrium where one or more agents are non-truthful. Worse still, the truthful proÖle may not constitute a Nash Equilibrium, and every non-truthful proÖle that constitutes a Nash Equilibrium may lead to a random assignment which is not ordinally e¢ cient, not even weakly envy-free, and which admits an ex-post ine¢ cient decomposition. A strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium may not exist, but when it exists, any proÖle that constitutes a strong ordinal Nash Equilibrium induces the random assignment induced under the truthful proÖle. The results of our equilibrium analysis of PS call for caution when implementing it in small assignment problems.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Science+Business Mediaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Game Theory
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleAn equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatuspublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0001-7053-4735 & YÖK ID 188443) Ekici, Özgün
dc.contributor.ozuauthorEkici, Özgün
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000382036700010
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9
dc.subject.keywordsRandom assignmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsProbabilistic serialen_US
dc.subject.keywordsEquilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordsNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordsOrdinal Nash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordsStrong ordinal Nash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordsOrdinal efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsEnvy-freenessen_US
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-84927555671
dc.contributor.authorMale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryArticle - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff


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