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dc.contributor.authorAkın, Özlem
dc.contributor.authorMontalvo, J. G.
dc.contributor.authorVillar, J. G.
dc.contributor.authorPeydró, J.-L.
dc.contributor.authorRaya, J. M.
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-15T10:56:59Z
dc.date.available2014-12-15T10:56:59Z
dc.date.issued2014-08
dc.identifier.issn1869-4195
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/713
dc.identifier.urihttp://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13209-014-0115-9
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the determinants of real estate and credit bubbles using a unique borrower-lender matched dataset on mortgage loans in Spain. The dataset contain real estate credit and price conditions (loan principal and spread, and the appraisal and market price) at the mortgage level, matched with borrower characteristics (such as income, labor status and contract) and the lender identity, over the last credit boom and bust. We find that lending standards are softer in the boom than in the bust. Moreover, despite some adjustment in lending conditions in the good times depending on borrower risk, the results suggest too soft lending standards and excessive risk-taking in the boom. For example, mortgage spreads for non-employed are identical to employed borrowers during the boom. Banks with worse corporate governance problems soften even more the standards. Finally, we analyze the mechanism by which banks could increase the supply of mortgage loans despite of regulatory restrictions on LTVs. The evidence is consistent with banks encouraging real estate appraisal firms to introduce an upward bias in appraisal prices (29 %), to meet loan-to-value regulatory thresholds (40 % of mortgages are just bunched on these limits), thus building-up the credit and the real estate bubble.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Ciencia e Innovacion ; the Generalitat de Catalunya ; Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Science+Business Mediaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofSERIEs
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.titleThe real estate and credit bubble: evidence from Spainen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.description.versionpublisher version
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatuspublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0003-2115-8416 & YÖK ID 234936) Akın, Özlem
dc.contributor.ozuauthorAkın, Özlem
dc.identifier.volume5
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.startpage223
dc.identifier.endpage243
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000341578800005
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13209-014-0115-9
dc.subject.keywordsLending standardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsCredit supplyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsExcessive risk-takingen_US
dc.subject.keywordsBank incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsConflicts of interesten_US
dc.subject.keywordsMoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordsPrudential policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordsFinancial crisesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsAsset price bubbleen_US
dc.subject.keywordsG01en_US
dc.subject.keywordsG21en_US
dc.subject.keywordsG28en_US
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-84920160675
dc.contributor.authorFemale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryArticle - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff


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