Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks
dc.contributor.author | Özener, Başak Altan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-06-30T08:32:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-06-30T08:32:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-10 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10679/6666 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176519302988 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study a sequential agency problem with hidden actions in an infinite horizon dynamic setting. The principal has a project that requires completion of two sequential tasks where the predecessor must be finished before the successor can be started. We characterize the efficient outcome as well as the optimal full commitment contract. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Economics Letters | |
dc.rights | restrictedAccess | |
dc.title | Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.peerreviewed | yes | en_US |
dc.publicationstatus | Published | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | Özyeğin University | |
dc.contributor.authorID | (ORCID 0000-0002-8960-5879 & YÖK ID 150968) Altan, Başak | |
dc.contributor.ozuauthor | Özener, Başak Altan | |
dc.identifier.volume | 183 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000487573400028 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606 | en_US |
dc.subject.keywords | Moral hazard | en_US |
dc.subject.keywords | Sequential tasks | en_US |
dc.subject.keywords | Optimal contract | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | SCOPUS:2-s2.0-85070390506 | |
dc.contributor.authorFemale | 1 | |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Article - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff |
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