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dc.contributor.authorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-30T08:32:43Z
dc.date.available2020-06-30T08:32:43Z
dc.date.issued2019-10
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/6666
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176519302988
dc.description.abstractWe study a sequential agency problem with hidden actions in an infinite horizon dynamic setting. The principal has a project that requires completion of two sequential tasks where the predecessor must be finished before the successor can be started. We characterize the efficient outcome as well as the optimal full commitment contract.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Letters
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleDynamic moral hazard with sequential tasksen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatusPublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0002-8960-5879 & YÖK ID 150968) Altan, Başak
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.identifier.volume183en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000487573400028
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606en_US
dc.subject.keywordsMoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordsSequential tasksen_US
dc.subject.keywordsOptimal contracten_US
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-85070390506
dc.contributor.authorFemale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryArticle - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff


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