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dc.contributor.authorAndrews, M.
dc.contributor.authorÖzen, Ulaş
dc.contributor.authorReiman, M. I.
dc.contributor.authorWang, Q.
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-22T13:06:10Z
dc.date.available2016-02-22T13:06:10Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.isbn978-147990056-5
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/3602
dc.identifier.urihttp://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?reload=true&arnumber=6562872
dc.descriptionDue to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
dc.description.abstractThe interaction of a content provider with end users on an infrastructure platform built and maintained by a service provider can be viewed as a two-sided market. Content sponsoring, i.e., charging the content provider instead of viewers for resources consumed in viewing the content, can benefit all parties involved. Without being charged directly or having it counted against their monthly data quotas, end users will view more content, allowing the content provider to generate more advertising revenue, extracted by the service provider to subsidize its investment and operation of the network infrastructure. However, realizing such gains requires a proper contractual relationship between the service provider and content provider. We consider the determination of this contract through a Stackelberg game. The service provider sets a pricing schedule for sponsoring and the content provider responds by deciding how much content to sponsor. We analyze the best strategies for the content provider and service provider in the event that the underlying demand for the content is uncertain. Two separate settings are defined. In the first, end users can be charged for non-sponsored views on a per-byte basis. In the second we extend the model to the more common case in which end users purchase data quotas on a periodic basis. Our main conclusion is that a coordinating contract can be designed that maximizes total system profit. Moreover, the additional profit due to sponsoring can be split between the content provider and service provider in an arbitrary manner.
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.ispartofComputer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2013 IEEE Conference on
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleEconomic models of sponsored content in wireless networks with uncertain demanden_US
dc.typeConference paperen_US
dc.peerreviewedyes
dc.publicationstatuspublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID25316
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖzen, Ulaş
dc.identifier.startpage345
dc.identifier.endpage350
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000326803100053
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/INFCOMW.2013.6562872
dc.subject.keywordsAdvertising
dc.subject.keywordsEconomics
dc.subject.keywordsInvestment
dc.subject.keywordsPricing
dc.subject.keywordsWireless channels
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-84883006511


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