Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorŞensoy, Murat
dc.contributor.editorCohen, R.
dc.contributor.editorFalcone, R.
dc.contributor.editorNorman, T.
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-15T07:33:14Z
dc.date.available2016-02-15T07:33:14Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1613-0073
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/2150
dc.identifier.urihttp://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1740/
dc.description.abstractStereotypes may influence the attitudes that individuals have towards others. Stereotypes, therefore, represent biases toward and against others. In this paper, we formalise stereotypical bias within trust evaluations. Then, using the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, we quantitatively analyse how cooperation and mutual trust between self-interested agents are affected by stereotypical bias. We present two key findings: i) stereotypical bias of one player may inhibit cooperation by creating incentives for others to defect, ii) even if only one of the players has a stereotypical bias, convergence of mutual trust between players may be strictly determined by the bias.
dc.description.sponsorshipU.S. Army Research Laboratory ; TÜBİTAK
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relationinfo:turkey/grantAgreement/TUBITAK/113E238
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the International Workshop on Trust in Agent Societies
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titleCooperation and trust in the presence of biasen_US
dc.typeConference paperen_US
dc.publicationstatuspublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0001-8806-4508 & YÖK ID 41438) Şensoy, Murat
dc.contributor.ozuauthorŞensoy, Murat
dc.identifier.volume1740
dc.identifier.startpage24
dc.identifier.endpage34
dc.subject.keywordsMulti agent systems
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-85006110928
dc.contributor.authorMale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryConference Paper - International - Institutional Academic Staff


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


Share this page