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dc.contributor.authorEkici, Ali
dc.contributor.authorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.contributor.authorÖzener, Okan Örsan
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-26T13:10:00Z
dc.date.available2015-10-26T13:10:00Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn1366-588X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10679/973
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00207543.2015.1054451#.Vi4mvX7hDIU
dc.descriptionDue to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription.
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we study a duopolistic market of suppliers competing for the business of a retailer. The retailer sets the order cycle and quantities from each supplier to minimize its annual costs. Different from other studies in the literature, our work simultaneously considers the order size restriction and the benefit of order consolidation, and shows non-trivial pricing behaviour of the suppliers under different settings. Under asymmetric information setting, we formulate the pricing problem of the preferred supplier as a non-linear programming problem and use Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions to find the optimal solution. In general, unless the preferred supplier has high-order size limit, it prefers sharing the market with its competitor when retailer’s demand, benefit of order consolidation or fixed cost of ordering from the preferred supplier is high. We model the symmetric information setting as a two-agent non-zero sum pricing game and establish the equilibrium conditions. We show that a supplier might set a ‘threshold price’ to capture the entire market if its per unit fixed ordering cost is sufficiently small. Finally, we prove that there exists a joint-order Nash equilibrium only if the suppliers set identical prices low enough to make the retailer place full-size orders from both.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInforma Groupen_US
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.titlePricing decisions in a strategic single retailer/dual suppliers setting under order size constraintsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.peerreviewedyesen_US
dc.publicationstatuspublisheden_US
dc.contributor.departmentÖzyeğin University
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0002-9627-4780 & YÖK ID 124801) Ekici, Ali
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0002-8960-5879 & YÖK ID 150968) Altan, Başak
dc.contributor.authorID(ORCID 0000-0002-9291-1877 & YÖK ID 21945) Özener, Örsan
dc.contributor.ozuauthorEkici, Ali
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖzener, Başak Altan
dc.contributor.ozuauthorÖzener, Okan Örsan
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000372728700001
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00207543.2015.1054451
dc.subject.keywordsOrder size constraintsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsPricingen_US
dc.subject.keywordsOrder consolidationen_US
dc.subject.keywordsNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordsEOQen_US
dc.subject.keywordsInformation asymmetryen_US
dc.identifier.scopusSCOPUS:2-s2.0-84931864192
dc.contributor.authorMale2
dc.contributor.authorFemale1
dc.relation.publicationcategoryArticle - International Refereed Journal - Institutional Academic Staff


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